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DISAGREEMENT,	  DISPOSITIONS,	  AND	  HIGHER-­‐ORDER	  EVIDENCE	  by	  Paul	  Blaschko	  	  The	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐Milwaukee,	  2013	  Under	  the	  Supervision	  of	  Professor	  Edward	  Hinchman	  	  	  In	  opting	  to	  consider	  toy	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  -­‐-­‐	  cases	  that,	  like	  Christensen’s	  dinner	  bill	  scenario,	  obviously	  involve	  evidence-­‐sharing	  epistemic	  peers	  -­‐-­‐	  epistemologists	  have	  hitherto	  failed	  to	  take	  seriously	  a	  distinct	  and	  “deeper”	  kind	  of	  disagreement.	  The	  distinction	  emerges	  most	  clearly,	  I	  argue,	  when	  cases	  that	  are	  typically	  thought	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  “spinelessness”	  are	  brought	  in	  for	  more	  careful	  consideration	  (i.e.	  political	  disagreements,	  religious	  and	  philosophical	  disagreements,	  etc.).	  By	  picking	  out	  distinctive	  features	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  disagreement	  -­‐-­‐	  deep	  disagreement	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  arguing	  that	  it	  is,	  in	  fact,	  epistemically	  significant	  (though,	  perhaps	  requiring	  a	  different	  response	  than	  that	  required	  by	  toy	  cases	  of	  
shallow	  disagreement),	  I	  attempt	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  re-­‐orient	  the	  literature	  on	  disagreement,	  recommending	  that	  epistemologists	  focus	  their	  efforts	  on	  paradigmatic	  cases	  of	  deep	  disagreement	  and	  suggesting	  that	  this	  will	  resolve	  apparent	  tensions	  associated	  with	  “spinelessness”	  that	  have	  arisen	  within	  the	  literature.	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  "In	  this	  attitude	  [the	  whale]	  now	  shook	  the	  slight	  cedar	  boat	  as	  a	  mildly	  cruel	   cat	  her	  mouse.	  Ahab,	  helpless	   in	  the	   very	   jaws	   he	   hated,	   seized	   the	   long	   jaw	   with	   his	  naked	   hands,	   and	   wildly	   strove	   to	   wrench	   it	   from	   its	  grip.	  As	  he	  now	  thus	  vainly	  strove,	  the	  jaw	  slipped	  from	  him.	   The	   frail	   gunwales	   bent	   in	   and	   snapped	   as	   both	  jaws,	   like	  an	  enormous	  shears,	  bit	   the	  craft	   completely	  in	  twain.	  Ahab	  fell	  flat-­‐faced	  upon	  the	  sea."	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐-­‐Herman	  Melville,	  Moby	  Dick	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   Consider	  in	  broad	  outline	  the	  classic	  contemporary	  case	  of	  epistemic	  disagreement:	  you	  and	  I	  do	  some	  mental	  math	  and	  arrive	  at	  different	  conclusions	  about	  how	  much	  we	  each	  owe	  toward	  the	  dinner	  bill	  that	  we	  agreed	  to	  split.1	  Epistemologists	  on	  both	  ends	  of	  the	  steadfast/conciliatory	  spectrum	  find	  themselves	  agreeing	  that,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  such	  cases	  bring	  out	  the	  intuition	  that	  there	  is	  something	  evidentially,	  and	  thus	  epistemically,	  significant	  about	  the	  disagreement	  of	  equally	  reliable	  and	  well-­‐informed	  agents.	  After	  all,	  failure	  to	  take	  your	  divergent	  response	  “into	  account”	  -­‐-­‐	  whatever	  this	  may	  amount	  to	  -­‐-­‐	  would	  seemingly	  evince	  a	  rational	  defect	  on	  my	  part.	  On	  the	  flipside,	  incorporating	  the	  views	  of	  others	  -­‐-­‐	  views	  I	  encounter	  in	  the	  social	  give	  and	  take	  of	  reason	  -­‐-­‐	  into	  my	  own	  deliberation	  regarding	  what	  to	  believe	  is	  often	  praised	  as	  the	  very	  hallmark	  of	  rationality	  and	  reasonableness.	  In	  the	  middle	  distance,	  however,	  looms	  a	  dark	  and	  ominous	  cloud:	  many	  of	  our	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  -­‐-­‐	  indeed	  entire	  worldviews	  that	  we	  ourselves	  endorse	  -­‐-­‐	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  deep	  and	  apparently	  insoluble	  disagreement.	  Consider	  the	  case	  where	  I	  take	  it	  that	  personal	  experiences	  that	  I	  have	  while	  praying	  or	  simply	  experiencing	  natural	  beauty	  (“religious	  seemings”	  you	  might	  call	  them)	  can	  somehow	  contribute	  justification	  to	  my	  belief	  that	  God	  exists,2	  and	  you	  disagree.3	  While	  we	  may	  formerly	  have	  thought	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  case,	  of	  course,	  was	  originally	  offered	  by	  David	  Christensen	  in	  (Christensen,	  TKTK).	  2	  Perhaps	  I	  think	  such	  religious	  seemings	  contribute	  justification	  to	  my	  belief	  in	  God	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  interpersonal	  experiences	  I	  have	  when	  I	  interact	  with	  you	  could	  contribute	  justification	  to	  my	  belief	  in	  your	  existence.	  3	  While	  this	  paper	  will	  not	  take	  up	  questions	  of	  religious	  belief	  explicitly,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  accounts	  of	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement	  are	  often	  thought	  to	  have	  application	  within	  this	  domain.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  accident,	  considering	  that	  the	  contemporary	  literature	  on	  disagreement	  can	  plausibly	  be	  claimed	  to	  find	  its	  genesis	  in	  such	  disagreements.	  For	  a	  relevant	  overview	  see	  (Kelly,	  2005;	  especially	  pages	  8-­‐9).	  For	  a	  seminal	  treatment	  of	  disagreement	  and	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disagreements	  as	  slight	  ripples	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  our	  self-­‐awareness	  requiring	  us	  to	  take	  note	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  helpful	  reminder,	  perhaps,	  that	  we	  are	  none	  of	  us	  epistemically	  infallible	  -­‐-­‐	  they	  now	  threaten	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  depths	  larger	  and	  with	  jaws	  wide	  open,	  leaving	  us,	  like	  the	  obsessive	  and	  ill-­‐fated	  Ahab,	  clinging	  to	  the	  barely	  buoyant	  fragments	  of	  what	  we	  once	  took	  to	  be	  a	  sea-­‐worthy	  vessel.	  	   In	  simpler	  language:	  admitting	  that	  peer	  disagreement	  is	  pervasive	  raises	  a	  worry	  that	  epistemologists	  have	  referred	  to	  as	  “spinelessness”	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  gist	  of	  this	  worry	  is	  that	  accounts	  developed	  to	  provide	  the	  epistemically	  appropriate	  response	  to	  cases	  like	  the	  dinner	  bill	  case	  (alluded	  to	  above)	  are	  going	  to	  rationally	  require	  that	  we	  become	  agnostic	  or	  “go	  spineless”	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  beliefs	  that	  we	  are	  now	  very	  confident	  in	  because	  these	  beliefs	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  actual	  and	  vehement	  peer	  disagreement.	  Here’s	  Elga	  presenting	  the	  problem	  of	  spinelessness	  in	  the	  course	  of	  defending	  his	  own	  radically	  conciliationist	  account	  against	  it:	  The	  equal	  weight	  view...requires	  you	  to	  weigh	  each	  stance	  equally,	  along	  with	  your	  own.	  But	  that	  requires	  you	  to	  think,	  of	  each	  stance,	  that	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  right.	  Typically,	  it	  will	  follow	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  the	  issue.	  Since	  it	  seems	  that	  you	  are	  in	  this	  circumstance	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  great	  many	  issues,	  the	  equal	  weight	  view	  requires	  you	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  all	  of	  these.	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  convictions	  on	  controversial	  political,	  philosophical,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  religious	  belief	  see	  (Gutting,	  1982).	  For	  more,	  contemporary	  engagement	  with	  this	  question	  see	  (Feldman,	  2004)	  and	  (Feldman,	  2005).	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scientific	  matters?	  The	  equal	  weight	  view	  seems	  to	  say:	  kiss	  them	  goodbye.	  (Elga,	  Reflection	  and	  Disagreement	  9	  and	  10)	  	   Elga	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  neither	  his	  view	  nor	  more	  moderate	  forms	  of	  conciliationism	  entail	  spineless	  because	  “epistemic	  peers”	  (properly	  defined)	  are	  extremely	  few	  and	  far	  between.	  Once	  we	  come	  to	  appreciate	  this	  fact,	  Egla	  thinks,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  are	  a	  relatively	  rare	  phenomenon.	  This	  is	  one	  route	  to	  take	  around	  the	  problem	  of	  spinelessness,	  but,	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one.	  Others,	  with	  commitments	  similar	  to	  Elga,	  argue	  that	  spinelessness	  fails	  to	  present	  a	  massive	  intellectual	  threat	  because	  a	  proper	  understand	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  “share	  evidence”	  (even	  among	  epistemic	  peers)	  will	  rule	  out	  problematic	  cases,	  or	  at	  least	  scale	  down	  the	  threat	  of	  spinelessness	  until	  it	  appears	  more	  like	  a	  requirement	  to	  give	  an	  intellectually	  humble	  nod	  to	  those	  who	  are	  less	  evidentially	  privileged	  than	  oneself.	  According	  to	  all	  such	  views,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  “shallow”	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  (like	  that	  involving	  the	  dinner	  bill),	  and	  “deep”	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  (like	  religious	  or	  political	  disputes),	  and	  this	  difference	  will	  ensure	  that	  disagreement	  is	  not	  pervasive	  enough	  to	  cumulatively	  provide	  enough	  evidence	  to	  call	  into	  question	  the	  majority	  of	  beliefs	  that	  make	  up	  one’s	  worldview.	  	  The	  phenomena	  we’ve	  been	  discussing	  -­‐-­‐	  peer	  disagreement	  -­‐-­‐	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  may	  provide	  fundamental	  insights	  into	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  epistemic	  rationality,	  turns	  out	  to	  have	  been	  an	  awkward	  red	  herring.	  It	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  arises,	  not	  during	  the	  heated	  debates	  we	  have	  over	  dinner,	  but	  afterwards,	  while	  we	  try	  to	  add	  up	  our	  respective	  shares	  of	  the	  bill.	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   Elga	  and	  others4	  are	  right	  to	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  their	  views	  do	  not	  entail	  spinelessness:	  no	  view	  that	  does	  could	  be	  a	  serious	  contender	  in	  questions	  of	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement.	  They	  are	  also	  right	  in	  thinking	  that	  the	  best	  strategy	  for	  doing	  so	  will	  involve	  picking	  out	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  types	  of	  cases	  thus	  far	  considered	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  those	  that	  would	  be	  susceptible	  to	  spineless	  worries.	  But	  they	  go	  seriously	  wrong	  -­‐-­‐	  or	  so	  I	  will	  argue	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  setting	  up	  as	  targets	  intuitive	  notions	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  an	  “epistemic	  peer”	  or	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  such	  peers	  to	  “share	  evidence”	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  disputed	  question.	  We	  know	  what	  it	  means	  to	  share	  evidence,	  and	  we	  know	  that	  there	  are	  many	  people	  in	  the	  world	  who	  count	  as	  our	  epistemic	  peers.	  Their	  mistake	  is	  to	  move	  unquestioningly	  from	  toy	  cases	  like	  the	  one	  we	  began	  with,	  to	  the	  larger	  and	  more	  disparate	  cases	  that	  would	  be	  the	  target	  of	  a	  requirement	  to	  go	  spineless.	  The	  fact	  that	  cases	  like	  those	  involving	  “religious	  seemings”	  (or	  political	  disputes,	  or	  philosophical	  disagreements)	  have	  been	  considered	  only	  in	  extreme	  abstraction	  (i.e.	  in	  connection	  with	  general	  problems	  like	  spinelessness)	  is	  an	  oversight	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  in	  this	  paper.	  Rather	  than	  considering	  toy	  cases	  in	  painstaking	  detail,	  and	  then	  gesturing	  vaguely	  at	  the	  truly	  problematic	  cases	  of	  disagreement,	  the	  argument	  in	  this	  paper	  suggests	  that	  we	  take	  on	  the	  problematic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Here’s	  Christensen	  defending	  conciliationism	  from	  a	  similar	  objection:	  “On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  areas	  of	  morality,	  religion,	  politics,	  and	  economics,	  and,	  unfortunately,	  philosophy	  which	  are	  rife	  with	  disagreement.	  Why	  is	  this?	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  disagreement	  flourishes	  when	  evidence	  is	  meager	  or	  poorly	  distributed,	  or	  when,	  due	  to	  our	  emotional	  or	  intellectual	  limitations,	  we	  are	  just	  not	  very	  good	  at	  reacting	  correctly	  to	  the	  evidence.	  In	  other	  words,	  disagreement	  flourishes	  when	  epistemic	  conditions	  are	  bad.	  To	  focus	  in	  on	  my	  own	  Field,	  I	  think	  that	  we	  all	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  epistemic	  conditions	  are	  not	  so	  great	  in	  philosophy.”	  (Christensen,	  2007c,	  28)	  Note	  that	  he	  does	  not	  use	  the	  objection	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  disown	  these	  sorts	  of	  cases,	  or	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  analysis,	  instead	  he	  opts	  to	  spin	  the	  incredibly	  revisionary	  implications	  of	  his	  view	  in	  a	  more	  favorable	  light.	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cases	  of	  disagreement	  head	  on,	  in	  order	  to	  see	  if	  we	  can	  discern	  any	  distinctive	  features.	  	  	   To	  show	  my	  hand	  from	  the	  outset:	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  we	  will	  discover	  some	  such	  features,	  and	  that	  the	  way	  around	  spinelessness	  may	  be	  simply	  to	  consider	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  latter	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  differ	  from	  those	  currently	  on	  offer.	  My	  thesis,	  then,	  is	  diagnostic:	  I	  mean	  to	  examine	  and	  identify	  a	  difference	  between	  toy	  cases	  and	  cases	  that	  would	  seemingly	  make	  us	  susceptible	  to	  spinelessness,	  and	  to	  use	  this	  difference	  to	  explain	  our	  (appropriate)	  suspicion	  of	  spinelessness	  without	  complicating	  with	  the	  easily	  grasped	  concepts	  of	  epistemic	  peerhood	  or	  shared	  evidence.	  This	  difference,	  I	  shall	  claim,	  both	  explains	  why	  spinelessness	  will	  not	  threaten	  views	  along	  the	  traditional	  spectrum	  that	  has	  emerged,	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement	  has	  gone	  slightly	  off	  the	  rails	  in	  a	  very	  important	  way.	  	   More	  specifically:	  in	  this	  paper	  I	  aim	  to	  vindicate	  three	  intuitive	  propositions	  about	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement,	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  objectionable	  strategies	  to	  which	  I	  have	  just	  referred.	  Those	  propositions	  are:	  (a)	  	   The	  proper	  response	  to	  the	  cases	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  to	  reduce	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  original	  proposition	  	  (b)	  	   Many	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  disagree	  with	  me	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  	  (c)	  	   It	  would	  be	  irrational	  for	  me	  to	  go	  spineless	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	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Since	  (a)	  and	  (b)	  only	  entail	  spinelessness	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  my	  disagreements	  with	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  regarding	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  are	  all	  of	  the	  same	  type	  as	  those	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  (that	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  all	  disagreements	  are	  “shallow”	  disagreements),	  a	  distinction	  that	  could	  falsify	  this	  assumption	  would	  render	  (a),	  (b),	  and	  (c)	  consistent.	  This	  tension	  is	  the	  main	  sticking	  point	  for	  theories	  of	  disagreement	  currently	  considered	  viable,	  and	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  nice	  framework	  within	  the	  literature	  for	  my	  central	  concerns.	  Thus,	  I	  will	  use	  this	  tension	  as	  a	  point	  of	  engagement	  with	  (and	  eventual	  departure	  from)	  the	  literature.	  Its	  explication	  and	  resolution	  will	  serve	  merely	  as	  bookends,	  however,	  for	  what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  main	  contribution	  of	  this	  paper:	  the	  introduction	  and	  seminal	  analysis	  of	  a	  type	  of	  disagreement	  that	  we	  have	  hitherto	  failed	  to	  consider	  in	  its	  concrete	  instances,	  a	  kind	  of	  disagreement	  that	  is	  both	  epistemically	  rich	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  and	  distinct	  from	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  disagreement	  currently	  under	  consideration	  in	  the	  literature.	  	   After	  setting	  up	  the	  dialectic	  of	  this	  paper	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  tension	  in	  §	  I,	  I	  will	  introduce	  cases	  and	  distinguish	  these	  types	  of	  disagreement	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  §	  II.	  In	  that	  I	  section	  I	  will	  also	  raise	  two	  immediate	  objections	  to	  the	  distinction	  in	  order	  to	  postpone	  discussion	  of	  them	  until	  §	  IV.	  I	  will	  then	  consider	  the	  nature	  of	  evidential	  dispositions	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  §	  III.	  In	  §	  IV	  I	  consider	  and	  argue	  against	  the	  objection	  (originally	  raise	  in	  II)	  that	  plausible	  conditions	  on	  peerhood	  will	  prevent	  dispositional	  disagreements	  from	  arising	  in	  an	  epistemically	  significant	  way.	  In	  §	  V,	  I	  present	  Kelly’s	  Total	  Evidence	  View	  and	  Christensen’s	  Conciliationism	  in	  more	  detail.	  I	  argue	  in	  §	  VI	  that	  both	  accounts	  are	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incomplete	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  treat	  dispositional	  disagreements	  as	  epistemically	  significant.	  In	  both	  accounts	  this	  failure	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  are	  grounded	  in	  calculative	  errors,	  and	  is	  evinced	  by	  their	  defenders’	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  cases	  of	  calculative	  disagreement.	  In	  §	  VII,	  I	  give	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  this	  is	  problematic	  for	  these	  views.	  In	  the	  penultimate	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  (§	  VIII),	  I	  respond	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  dispositional	  disagreements	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  epistemological	  accounts	  of	  disagreement,	  by	  showing	  that	  this	  objection,	  if	  true,	  would	  itself	  require	  vast	  revisions	  to	  the	  contemporary	  literature.	  §	  IX	  concludes	  the	  paper	  with	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  my	  main	  argument,	  and	  gestures	  at	  the	  form	  theories	  that	  take	  seriously	  my	  distinction	  might	  take.	  
I.	  Discerning	  the	  Depth	  of	  a	  Disagreement	  	   Consider	  once	  more	  the	  classic	  case	  of	  disagreement,	  this	  time	  offered	  in	  more	  detail:	  
Mental	  Math:	  After	  a	  nice	  restaurant	  meal,	  my	  friend	  and	  I	  decide	  to	  tip	  20%	  and	  split	  the	  check,	  rounding	  up	  to	  the	  nearest	  dollar.	  As	  we	  have	  done	  many	  times,	  we	  do	  the	  math	  in	  our	  heads.	  We	  have	  long	  and	  equally	  good	  track	  records	  at	  this	  (in	  the	  cases	  where	  we’ve	  disagreed,	  checking	  with	  a	  calculator	  has	  shown	  us	  right	  equally	  frequently);	  and	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  (such	  as	  those	  involving	  alertness	  or	  tiredness,	  or	  differential	  consumption	  of	  coffee	  or	  wine)	  for	  suspecting	  one	  of	  us	  to	  be	  especially	  good,	  or	  bad,	  at	  the	  current	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reasoning	  task.	  I	  come	  up	  with	  $43;	  but	  then	  my	  friend	  announces	  that	  she	  got	  $45.	  (Christensen,	  2011)	  The	  case	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  paradigmatic	  instance	  of	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreement,	  and	  for	  good	  reason.	  First,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  a	  case	  of	  disagreement	  between	  epistemic	  peers.	  While	  this	  relationship	  is	  not	  spelled	  out	  all	  too	  frequently	  in	  the	  literature,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  clear	  that	  two	  individuals	  with	  equally	  long	  and	  equally	  accurate	  track	  records	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  here)	  will	  stand	  in	  this	  relationship.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  two	  have	  access	  to	  all	  the	  same	  evidence;	  they	  have	  both	  looked	  at	  the	  receipt,	  what	  other	  evidence	  could	  there	  be	  in	  this	  case?	  Since	  these	  are	  the	  two	  ingredients	  necessary	  for	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreement,	  we	  have	  ourselves	  a	  genuine	  case.	  	   It	  is	  also	  a	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  what	  I	  want	  to	  call	  “shallow”	  disagreements	  (from	  now	  on	  without	  the	  quotation	  marks).	  The	  key	  move	  in	  this	  paper	  will	  be	  to	  distinguish	  such	  cases	  from	  “deeper”	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  (i.e.	  the	  type	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  spinelessness	  threatens),	  in	  a	  way	  that	  doesn’t	  make	  these	  deeper	  cases	  any	  less	  epistemically	  interesting	  (although	  it	  may	  be	  that	  the	  two	  types	  of	  case	  are	  epistemically	  interesting	  in	  very	  different	  ways).	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  will	  spend	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section	  attempting	  to	  elucidate	  a	  few	  characteristic	  features	  of	  shallow	  disagreements,	  by	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  disagreements	  have	  been	  treated	  in	  the	  literature.	  
I.a	  Shallow	  Disagreements	  and	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Literature	  consider	  two	  extreme	  (and	  overly	  simplistic)	  positions	  one	  might	  take	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  the	  disagreement	  in	  this	  case.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  one	  
	   	   9	   	   	  
	   	  
might	  hold	  what	  we	  can	  call	  a	  “conciliatory”	  position.	  According	  to	  Extreme	  
Conciliationism,	  the	  proper	  response	  to	  disagreement	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  is	  for	  each	  peer	  to	  reduce	  her	  credence	  in	  the	  disputed	  proposition	  by	  half	  (or,	  if	  we	  are	  working	  without	  degreed	  notions	  of	  belief,	  simply	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  the	  relevant	  proposition).	  The	  proper	  response	  in	  this	  case,	  according	  to	  the	  extreme	  conciliationist,	  would	  be	  for	  both	  Christensen	  and	  his	  friend	  to	  become	  much	  less	  confident	  in	  their	  original	  beliefs	  regarding	  the	  bill.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  might	  hold	  what	  we’ll	  call	  a	  “steadfast”	  position.	  According	  to	  Extreme	  
Steadfastianism,	  the	  proper	  response	  to	  disagreement	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  is	  for	  each	  peer	  to	  hold	  tight	  to	  her	  original	  answer,	  despite	  the	  disagreement.	  (I	  suppose	  this	  position	  needn’t	  be	  qualified	  in	  terms	  of	  degreed	  or	  wholesale	  beliefs	  since	  the	  response	  will	  be	  the	  same	  in	  either	  case:	  don’t	  budge!)	  The	  proper	  response	  in	  this	  case,	  according	  to	  the	  extreme	  steadfastian,	  would	  be	  for	  Christensen	  and	  his	  friend	  to	  maintain	  their	  original	  beliefs	  about	  the	  amount	  that	  each	  owed	  toward	  the	  bill,	  despite	  the	  disagreement	  in	  question.	  	   Of	  course,	  no	  one	  is	  going	  to	  hold	  either	  of	  these	  positions	  in	  their	  current	  (unqualified)	  forms.	  My	  purpose	  here,	  however,	  is	  simply	  to	  set	  up	  a	  dialectical	  framework	  (and	  not	  to	  advance	  a	  position	  rivaling	  either	  of	  these	  views,	  or	  more	  nuanced,	  actual	  versions	  of	  these	  views),	  so	  for	  now	  we’ll	  work	  with	  the	  extreme	  versions	  of	  the	  views	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  out	  in	  sharp	  relief	  a	  broad	  tension	  within	  the	  disagreement	  literature.	  	   Extreme	  Steadfastianism	  has	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  apparent	  problem	  that	  it	  is	  irrational	  to	  ignore	  disagreement	  with	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers.	  After	  all,	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one	  might	  reason	  in	  a	  case	  of	  actual	  disagreement	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  “X	  is	  my	  epistemic	  peer	  and	  shares	  all	  of	  my	  evidence,	  and	  yet	  she	  has	  come	  to	  a	  different	  conclusion	  that	  I	  have.	  Since	  I	  really	  don’t	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  I’ve	  gotten	  it	  right	  while	  she’s	  gotten	  it	  wrong	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand,	  I	  should	  probably	  be	  less	  confident	  in	  my	  original	  answer.”	  This	  seems	  like	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.	  It	  seems	  obviously	  right.	  In	  Mental	  Math	  it	  would	  be	  clearly	  wrong	  for	  either	  of	  the	  peers	  simply	  to	  ignore	  whatever	  evidence	  was	  provided	  by	  his	  friend’s	  disagreement.	  Disagreement	  seems	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  fallibility	  (even	  if	  it	  is,	  in	  fact,	  misleading	  evidence	  in	  a	  given	  case).	  	   Extreme	  Conciliationism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  faced	  with	  a	  different	  problem.	  Once	  the	  conciliationist	  has	  resolved	  the	  case	  at	  hand	  by	  reducing	  her	  confidence	  in	  the	  disputed	  proposition,	  she	  is	  going	  to	  have	  to	  face	  the	  fact	  that	  many,	  perhaps	  
most	  of	  her	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  exactly	  parallel	  disagreements.	  To	  put	  the	  point	  in	  terms	  already	  discussed:	  the	  conciliationist	  has	  to	  contend	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  her	  view	  entails	  spinelessness.	  	  	   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position,	  then,	  to	  appreciate	  an	  apparent	  tension	  within	  the	  literature	  on	  disagreement,	  and	  to	  see	  how	  a	  genuine	  distinction	  between	  shallow	  and	  deep	  disagreements	  might	  ease	  this	  tension	  in	  a	  theoretically	  fruitful	  way.	  Here	  is	  the	  tension	  in	  a	  set	  of	  three	  apparently	  incompatible	  propositions:	  (a)	  	   The	  proper	  response	  to	  the	  cases	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  to	  reduce	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  original	  proposition	  	  (b)	  	   Many	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  disagree	  with	  me	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	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(c)	  	   It	  would	  be	  irrational	  for	  me	  to	  go	  spineless	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  Let	  me	  emphasize,	  once	  again,	  the	  dialectical	  nature	  of	  this	  section.	  Surely	  there	  are	  ways	  that	  more	  nuanced	  versions	  of	  either	  of	  the	  extreme	  positions	  that	  I	  sketched	  could	  get	  around	  this	  tension.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  conciliationists	  might	  contend	  (and,	  indeed,	  some	  actually	  do)	  that	  (2)	  is	  simply	  false.	  According	  to	  this	  position,	  we	  needn’t	  go	  spineless	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  our	  beliefs,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  conciliationism	  is	  generally	  true,	  because	  cases	  of	  widespread	  and	  far	  reaching	  disagreement	  are	  only	  apparently	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  with	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers.	  When	  considered	  more	  carefully,	  these	  cases	  are	  revealed	  to	  be	  disagreements	  amongst	  people	  with	  whom	  one	  should	  not	  consider	  oneself	  in	  the	  peerhood	  relation.	  Likewise,	  steadfastians	  may	  (and	  some	  actually	  do)	  argue	  that	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  should	  make	  us	  less	  confident	  of	  (1).	  According	  to	  these	  philosophers,	  even	  when	  we	  ought	  to	  reduce	  confidence	  (as	  we	  perhaps	  should	  in	  cases	  like	  Mental	  Math),	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  because	  epistemic	  peers	  disagree	  with	  us,	  but	  for	  some	  further,	  more	  complex	  reason	  (a	  reason	  that	  may	  yield	  different	  results	  depending	  on	  the	  details	  of	  a	  given	  case)).	  My	  point	  in	  this	  section	  is	  not	  to	  explicate	  or	  engage	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  positions	  might	  resolve	  the	  tension.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  section,	  I	  simply	  want	  to	  point	  to	  one	  simple	  way	  of	  resolving	  the	  tension:	  i.e.	  adopting	  my	  proposed	  distinction.	  	   If	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  disagreements	  that	  are	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  calculative	  errors,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  deeper	  differences	  (whatever	  these	  may	  be),	  there	  is	  a	  straightforward	  way	  of	  maintaining	  (1),	  (2),	  and	  (3).	  First,	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(1)	  is	  true	  because	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  calculative	  error	  really	  ought	  to	  effect	  your	  beliefs	  in	  just	  the	  way	  extreme	  conciliationism	  suggests.	  
Mental	  Math	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  such	  a	  case,	  and	  -­‐-­‐	  just	  like	  (1)	  says	  -­‐-­‐	  conciliationism	  (even	  extreme	  conciliationism)	  gets	  things	  right	  in	  this	  case.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  no	  pressure	  on	  us	  to	  reject	  (2).	  I	  think	  the	  proposition	  itself	  is	  pre-­‐theoretically	  plausible	  enough	  (if	  not	  undeniable)	  once	  we	  understand	  the	  philosophical	  term	  of	  art	  “epistemic	  peer.”	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  people	  out	  there,	  probably	  hundreds	  of	  thousands,	  possibly	  millions,	  who	  are	  equally	  as	  epistemically	  equipped	  as	  I	  am,	  and	  who	  hold	  radically	  different	  (and	  incompatible)	  beliefs	  despite	  having	  access	  to	  all	  the	  same	  evidence.	  The	  only	  pressure	  I	  can	  see	  to	  reject	  (2)	  comes	  from	  theory-­‐preservation	  type	  reasons	  to	  revise	  this	  pre-­‐theoretic	  intuition	  (reasons	  like	  the	  ones	  that	  seem	  to	  motivate	  conciliationists	  to	  reject	  it),	  and,	  as	  we’ll	  see	  in	  a	  minute,	  my	  distinction	  can	  easily	  do	  away	  with	  this	  pressure.	  Finally,	  (3)	  is	  true	  in	  the	  following	  scenario:	  a)	  the	  beliefs	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  targeted	  by	  widespread	  disagreement	  with	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  are	  dispositional	  disagreements,	  and	  b)	  conciliationism	  (though	  it	  gets	  things	  right	  with	  regards	  to	  calculative	  disagreements)	  is	  not	  the	  proper	  epistemic	  response	  to	  dispositional	  disagreements.	  I	  won’t	  yet	  say	  what	  the	  proper	  response	  to	  such	  disagreements	  might	  be	  (I’ll	  save	  that	  for	  the	  final	  section),	  but	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  enough	  how	  this	  would	  relieve	  the	  tension	  that	  leads	  conciliationists	  to	  reject	  proposition	  (2).	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I.b	  Distinctive	  Features	  of	  Shallow	  Disagreements	  	   Before	  attempting	  to	  consider	  deep	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  at	  greater	  length,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  briefly	  consider	  the	  characteristic	  features	  of	  shallow	  disagreement	  that	  have	  emerged	  in	  the	  previous	  subsection.	  	   First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  disagreement	  in	  Mental	  Math	  is	  grounded	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  error.	  I	  will	  proceed	  (with	  great	  caution,	  lest	  I	  mislead	  the	  reader	  with	  an	  inappropriate	  term)	  to	  call	  the	  sort	  of	  error	  involved	  in	  Mental	  Math	  “calculative	  error.”5	  Calculative	  error	  is	  the	  type	  of	  error	  that	  gets	  you	  disqualified	  from	  a	  spelling	  bee	  on	  a	  word	  that	  you	  know	  or	  marked	  down	  on	  a	  math	  test	  despite	  having	  already	  acquired	  the	  relevant	  skills.	  When	  you	  ask	  me	  to	  add	  42	  and	  68	  in	  my	  head	  and	  I	  announce	  that	  the	  sum	  is	  100	  because	  I	  forget	  to	  “carry	  the	  one,”	  this	  omission	  is	  a	  calculative	  error.6	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  simply	  that	  it	  is	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  case	  under	  consideration	  that	  it	  necessarily	  involves	  that	  failure	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  agents	  to	  properly	  appreciate	  (or	  properly	  calculate)	  what	  they	  both	  -­‐-­‐	  by	  their	  own	  lights	  -­‐-­‐	  take	  to	  be	  the	  relevant	  evidence.	  In	  such	  cases,	  then,	  it	  is	  clear	  enough	  why	  we	  disagree:	  at	  least	  one	  of	  us	  has	  made	  an	  error	  in	  the	  mental	  calculations	  that	  we	  both	  performed.	  This	  kind	  of	  fallibility	  -­‐-­‐	  fallibility	  with	  respect	  to	  evaluating	  what	  the	  evidence	  actually	  supports	  -­‐-­‐	  has	  become	  central	  in	  discussions	  of	  the	  epistemic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  term	  “calculative”	  here	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  to	  imply	  that	  all	  such	  errors	  are	  mathematical.	  The	  term	  will	  be	  used	  more	  broadly	  to	  include	  general	  calculations	  about	  what	  some	  evidence	  supports.	  When	  you	  and	  I	  encounter	  a	  logic	  puzzle	  and	  I	  give	  the	  wrong	  answer	  I	  have	  committed	  a	  calculative	  error	  in	  the	  broad	  sense	  that	  I	  will	  employ	  throughout	  this	  paper.	  	  6	  Of	  course,	  calculative	  errors	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  complex.	  As	  we’ve	  seen,	  announcing	  that	  Horse	  A	  has	  won	  the	  race	  based	  on	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  indisputable	  visual	  evidence	  (“I	  just	  saw	  it!”)	  is	  a	  calculative	  error	  if	  an	  ideally	  rational	  agent	  with	  the	  same	  perceptual	  data	  would	  have	  been	  less	  confident,	  or	  would	  have	  declared	  Horse	  B	  the	  winner.	  Similarly,	  believing	  that	  the	  available	  meteorological	  data	  suggests	  rain	  in	  the	  five	  day	  forecast	  when	  it	  actually	  suggests	  a	  week	  of	  dry	  heat	  and	  sun	  is	  also	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  calculative	  error.	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significance	  of	  disagreement.	  To	  many,	  it	  seems	  uncontroversial	  to	  suppose	  that	  disagreement	  with	  epistemic	  peers	  serves	  as	  “higher-­‐order	  evidence”7	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  fallibility.	  	   This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  feature,	  then,	  of	  such	  cases	  (shallow	  cases,	  as	  I’ve	  been	  calling	  them).	  Shallow	  cases	  of	  disagreement,	  if	  they	  provide	  evidence	  at	  all,	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  distinctively	  third-­‐personal	  sort	  of	  evidence.	  Allow	  me	  to	  explain.	  In	  his	  seminal	  analysis	  of	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  disagreement,	  Kelly	  finds	  himself	  asking	  a	  somewhat	  odd	  question:	  what	  does	  disagreement	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement	  anyways?	  He	  comes	  by	  this	  question	  by	  the	  following	  line	  of	  reasoning:	  if	  disagreements	  are	  significant	  because	  they	  are	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  our	  cognitive	  fallibility,	  then	  why	  shouldn’t	  we	  be	  concerned,	  not	  only	  with	  real	  disagreements,	  but	  also	  with	  possible	  disagreements?	  (I.e.	  disagreements	  that	  we	  would	  consider	  to	  have	  the	  same	  evidential	  force	  if	  they	  had	  proponents,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  positions	  don’t	  (actually)	  have	  any	  proponents.)	  But	  if	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  possible	  disagreements	  just	  as	  seriously	  as	  actual	  disagreements,	  what’s	  so	  important	  about	  disagreement	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It’s	  worth	  quoting	  Kelly	  at	  some	  length:	  Whether	  we	  find	  the	  possibility	  of	  disagreement	  intellectually	  threatening,	  I	  suggest,	  will	  and	  should	  ultimately	  depend	  on	  our	  considered	  judgements	  about	  how	  rational	  the	  merely	  possible	  dissenters	  might	  be	  in	  so	  dissenting.	  And	  our	  assessment	  of	  whether	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  difference	  between	  first-­‐order	  and	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  is	  raised	  in	  (Kelly,	  2005),	  and	  treated	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  (Kelly,	  2010)	  and	  (Christensen,	  2010).	  It	  is	  an	  issue	  to	  which	  I	  will	  return	  in	  section	  IV.	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rational	  dissent	  is	  possible	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  question	  (or	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  dissent	  might	  be	  rational)	  will	  depend	  in	  turn	  on	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  arguments	  that	  might	  be	  put	  forward	  on	  behalf	  of	  such	  dissent.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  correct,	  then	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  merely	  possible	  dissent	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  intellectually	  threatening	  effectively	  reduces	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  might	  be	  put	  forward	  on	  behalf	  of	  such	  dissent.	  Now,	  there	  might	  be	  cases	  in	  which	  we	  judge	  that	  the	  arguments	  and	  evidence	  that	  could	  be	  brought	  forth	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  dissent	  are	  truly	  formidable,	  and	  this	  might	  justifiably	  make	  us	  doubt	  our	  own	  beliefs.	  But	  in	  that	  case,	  the	  reasons	  that	  we	  have	  for	  skepticism	  are	  provided	  by	  the	  state	  of	  the	  evidence	  itself,	  and	  our	  own	  judgements	  about	  the	  probative	  force	  of	  that	  evidence.	  The	  role	  of	  disagreement,	  whether	  possible	  or	  actual,	  ultimately	  proves	  superfluous	  or	  inessential	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  case	  for	  such	  skepticism	  (Kelly,	  2007).	  And	  again,	  on	  this	  same	  note,	  Kelly	  concludes	  his	  paper:	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  disagreement	  does	  not	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  significance	  that	  has	  sometimes	  been	  claimed	  for	  it.	  Still,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  disagreement	  is	  therefore	  epistemically	  
insignificant.	  What	  epistemic	  role	  or	  roles	  are	  left	  for	  disagreement,	  on	  the	  view	  that	  I	  have	  defended?	  Of	  course,	  an	  awareness	  of	  disagreement	  can	  serve	  to	  call	  one's	  attention	  to	  arguments	  that	  one	  
	   	   16	   	   	  
	   	  
might	  never	  have	  considered	  or	  to	  evidence	  of	  which	  one	  might	  have	  been	  unaware.	  However,	  even	  when	  all	  parties	  to	  a	  dispute	  have	  access	  to	  the	  same	  evidence	  and	  arguments,	  disagreement	  can	  still	  play	  an	  epistemically	  salutary	  role	  (Kelly,	  2007).	  What	  is	  this	  role?	  Kelly’s	  “suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  role	  of	  actual	  disagreement	  among	  epistemic	  peers	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  role	  that	  actuality	  sometimes	  plays	  in	  falsifying	  modal	  claims	  that	  are	  mistakenly	  thought	  to	  be	  justified	  a	  priori”	  (ibid).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  whatever	  is	  epistemically	  interesting	  about	  disagreement	  cannot	  essentially	  involve	  the	  person	  with	  whom	  you	  happen	  to	  find	  yourself	  disagreeing.	  If	  you	  plausibly	  could	  have	  discovered	  the	  source	  of	  your	  calculative	  error	  on	  your	  own	  (given	  enough	  time	  or	  more	  cautious	  methodology),	  then	  disagreement	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  anything	  but	  first-­‐personal	  reasons	  to	  reducing	  your	  confidence	  in	  a	  belief.	  In	  short:	  disagreements	  serve	  a	  merely	  heuristic	  epistemic	  role.	  	   Thus	  far,	  I	  believe	  that	  they	  way	  in	  which	  Kelly	  has	  characterized	  disagreement	  applies	  across	  the	  board...to	  shallow	  disagreements!	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  we	  restrict	  ourselves,	  as	  epistemologists	  instinctively	  have,	  to	  cases	  of	  shallow	  disagreement,	  then	  we	  will	  find,	  with	  Kelly,	  that	  the	  epistemically	  interesting	  thing	  about	  disagreement	  is	  that	  there	  really	  isn’t	  anything	  particularly	  epistemically	  interesting	  about	  disagreement	  (per	  se).	  And	  this	  will	  be	  as	  true	  for	  conciliationists	  as	  it	  is	  for	  steadfastians.	  Vitally	  important	  at	  this	  juncture,	  however,	  is	  that	  a	  difference	  between	  shallow	  and	  deep	  disagreements	  capable	  of	  obviating	  the	  spinelessness	  tension	  presenting	  in	  the	  introduction	  may	  (and	  I	  think	  will)	  show	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Kelly’s	  generalizations	  to	  be	  true	  only	  of	  one	  sort	  of	  epistemically	  interesting	  disagreement.	  	   In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  paper	  I	  referred	  to	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  strategy	  that	  Elga	  and	  others	  have	  employed	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	  around	  the	  problem	  of	  spinelessness.	  My	  strategy	  does	  not	  differ	  in	  kind	  from	  the	  ones	  alluded	  to	  there:	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  strategy	  consists	  in	  identifying	  differences	  between	  the	  kinds	  of	  cases	  that	  we	  often	  consider	  in	  all	  their	  analytically	  interesting	  detail	  and	  the	  sorts	  of	  cases	  that	  we	  are	  reluctant	  to	  apply	  our	  findings	  to.	  My	  strategy	  does	  differ,	  however,	  in	  one	  way	  that	  has	  crucial	  implications	  for	  the	  literature	  on	  peer	  disagreement.	  While	  Elga	  (et	  al.)	  claim	  that	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  case	  differ	  insofar	  as	  the	  shallow	  cases	  are	  epistemically	  significant	  (since	  they	  involve	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers)	  while	  the	  deep	  cases	  are	  not	  (since	  they	  must	  involve	  non-­‐comparable	  agents,	  or	  fail	  to	  involve	  a	  shared	  body	  of	  evidence),	  my	  analysis	  makes	  no	  such	  claim.	  In	  fact,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  the	  deeper	  cases	  disagreement	  that	  have	  concerned	  us	  all	  along.	  The	  shallow	  cases,	  to	  my	  mind,	  have	  always	  stood	  in	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  deeper	  cases;	  though,	  in	  figuring	  out	  the	  proper	  epistemic	  responses	  to	  these	  cases,	  we	  have	  come	  to	  appreciate	  how	  dissimilar	  they	  are	  to	  the	  truly	  interesting	  sort.	  By	  allowing	  for	  cases	  of	  deep	  disagreement	  to	  be	  epistemically	  significant	  (as	  my	  analysis	  does)	  we	  avoid	  worries	  about	  spinelessness	  by	  recognizing	  that	  we’ve	  been	  failing	  to	  consider	  what’s	  truly	  interesting	  about	  disagreements:	  that	  deep	  and	  problematic	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  don’t	  serve	  as	  a	  mere	  “heuristic”	  for	  a	  simple	  sort	  of	  cognitive	  error	  that	  we	  could,	  in	  principle,	  have	  avoided	  had	  we	  been	  a	  bit	  more	  careful,	  but	  rather	  open	  our	  deliberative	  processes	  
	   	   18	   	   	  
	   	  
up	  to	  the	  social	  influences	  by	  forcing	  us	  to	  take	  seriously	  not	  just	  the	  possibility	  but	  
the	  actuality	  that	  there	  is	  more	  way	  to	  look	  at	  a	  shared	  body	  of	  evidence;	  by	  presenting	  us	  with	  this	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  forcing	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  In	  this	  way,	  then,	  we	  can	  reintroduce	  the	  social	  element	  of	  disagreement	  that	  has	  so	  captivated	  us	  from	  the	  outset.	  By	  refusing	  to	  restrict	  our	  attention	  to	  shallow	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  (that	  are	  essentially	  just	  another	  form	  of	  first-­‐personal	  reasoning),	  we	  can	  once	  more	  perplex	  ourselves	  with	  the	  questions	  that	  have	  bother	  us	  every	  time	  we	  encounter	  another	  opinion,	  or	  system	  of	  beliefs,	  or	  worldview.	  We	  can,	  in	  short,	  begin	  discussing	  disagreement.	  	  
II.	  Key	  Cases	  and	  an	  Objection	  to	  the	  Proposed	  Distinction	  	   What	  the	  appropriate	  epistemic	  response	  is	  to	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  central	  question	  of	  disagreement	  -­‐-­‐	  will	  depend	  on	  a	  judgment	  about	  what	  must	  explain	  the	  dispute	  in	  question.	  More	  specifically,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  choose	  between	  versions	  of	  the	  positions	  introduced	  in	  section	  I	  (and	  then	  to	  pursue	  one	  of	  the	  strategies	  there	  detailed)	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  think	  disagreement	  serves	  always	  as	  “higher-­‐order	  evidence”	  of	  one’s	  fallibility	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  proper	  appreciation	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  support	  among	  one’s	  evidence.8	  But	  why	  would	  we	  think	  this?	  	   Consider	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  type	  of	  case	  that	  is	  most	  often	  examined	  in	  the	  literature.	  Like	  Mental	  Math	  above,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  case	  of	  what	  I	  have	  been	  calling	  calculative	  disagreement:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  many	  take	  it	  that	  disagreement	  does	  always	  serve	  this	  role.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  (Christensen,	  2009),	  (Kelly,	  2010),	  and	  (Elga,	  2007).	  In	  fact,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  taking	  this	  supposition	  for	  granted	  commits	  these	  philosophers	  to	  implausible	  solutions	  to	  the	  tension	  offered	  in	  section	  I.	  Ultimately,	  I	  think	  that	  this	  serves	  as	  more	  motivation	  for	  accepting	  my	  distinction.	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Case	  1.	  You	  and	  I,	  two	  equally	  attentive	  and	  well-­‐sighted	  individuals,	  stand	  side-­‐by-­‐	  side	  at	  the	  finish	  line	  of	  a	  horse	  race.	  The	  race	  is	  extremely	  close.	  At	  time	  t0,	  just	  as	  the	  first	  horses	  cross	  the	  finish	  line,	  it	  looks	  to	  me	  as	  though	  Horse	  A	  has	  won	  the	  race	  in	  virtue	  of	  finishing	  slightly	  ahead	  of	  Horse	  B;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  looks	  to	  you	  as	  though	  Horse	  B	  has	  won	  in	  virtue	  of	  finishing	  slightly	  ahead	  of	  Horse	  A.	  At	  time	  1,	  an	  instant	  later,	  we	  discover	  that	  we	  disagree	  about	  which	  horse	  has	  won	  the	  race.	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  should	  we	  revise	  our	  original	  judgments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  new	  information?	  (Kelly,	  2010)	  And	  another:	  
Case	  2.	  You	  and	  I	  are	  each	  attempting	  to	  determine	  the	  current	  temperature	  by	  consulting	  our	  own	  personal	  thermometers.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  two	  thermometers	  have	  been	  equally	  reliable.	  At	  time	  t0,	  I	  consult	  my	  thermometer,	  find	  that	  it	  reads	  ‘68	  degrees’,	  and	  so	  immediately	  take	  up	  the	  corresponding	  belief.	  Meanwhile,	  you	  consult	  your	  thermometer,	  find	  that	  it	  reads	  ’72	  degrees’,	  and	  so	  immediately	  take	  up	  that	  belief.	  At	  time	  t1,	  you	  and	  I	  compare	  notes	  and	  discover	  that	  our	  thermometers	  have	  disagreed.	  How,	  if	  at	  all,	  should	  we	  revise	  our	  original	  opinions	  about	  the	  temperature	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this	  new	  information?	  (Kelly,	  2010)	  
Case	  1	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  our	  judgments	  has	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  
something	  or	  other.	  It	  can’t	  simply	  be	  that	  the	  evidence	  supported	  my	  judgment	  for	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me,	  while	  that	  same	  evidence	  supported	  your	  (incompatible)	  judgment	  for	  you.	  This	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fixed	  by	  the	  stipulations	  of	  peerhood	  offered	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  case:	  we’re	  equally	  well-­‐sighted	  and	  have	  records	  of	  equal	  reliability	  in	  the	  past,	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  better	  view	  of	  the	  finish	  line	  than	  I	  do	  (and,	  hence,	  no	  evidence	  that	  I	  lack),	  etc.	  But	  if	  there	  must	  be	  some	  difference	  that	  explains	  the	  disparity	  of	  our	  judgment,	  it	  must	  be	  that	  one	  of	  us	  has	  simply	  miscalculated	  (or	  perhaps	  both	  of	  us	  have).	  The	  difference	  in	  our	  judgments	  is	  explained	  by	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  appreciated	  our	  evidence.	  	   Case	  2,	  though,	  clearly	  brings	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  “differences”	  -­‐-­‐	  at	  least	  in	  the	  cases	  we	  are	  considering	  -­‐-­‐	  will	  inevitably	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  error	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  us.	  Calculative	  errors	  occur	  when	  one	  fails	  to	  properly	  appreciate	  some	  data	  that	  is,	  in	  some	  sense,	  in	  her	  possession,	  and	  that	  she	  knows	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  evidence.	  It	  is	  not	  as	  if	  you	  and	  I	  can	  simply	  have	  different	  ways	  of	  calculating	  visual	  (or	  mathematical	  or	  scientific)	  data,	  and	  that	  these	  ways	  can	  lead	  us	  (remember,	  we’re	  epistemic	  peers)	  to	  incompatible	  but	  equally	  well-­‐supported	  conclusions.	  In	  addition	  to	  meeting	  the	  requirements	  of	  peerhood,	  we	  have	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  evidence	  and	  how	  that	  evidence	  out	  to	  be	  calculated	  (just	  as	  we	  clearly	  do	  in	  Mental	  Math)	  and	  any	  deviation	  in	  calculation	  from	  this	  common	  understanding	  will,	  inevitably,	  constitute	  an	  error.	  	   But	  not	  all	  disagreements	  are	  like	  this.	  And	  this	  is	  true	  (as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  a	  moment)	  even	  for	  disagreements	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers.	  	   Consider	  the	  following	  controversial	  case,	  originally	  raised	  by	  Elga:	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Politics:	  consider	  Ann	  and	  Beth,	  two	  friends	  who	  stand	  at	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  Consider	  the	  claim	  that	  abortion	  is	  morally	  permissible.	  Does	  Ann	  consider	  Beth	  a	  peer	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  claim?	  That	  is:	  setting	  aside	  her	  own	  reasoning	  about	  the	  abortion	  claim	  (and	  Beth’s	  contrary	  view	  about	  it),	  does	  Ann	  think	  Beth	  would	  be	  just	  as	  likely	  as	  her	  to	  get	  things	  right?	  (Elga,	  2007)9	  Setting	  aside	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  dialectic	  of	  Elga’s	  paper	  here,	  I	  think	  it’s	  clear	  enough	  to	  see	  that	  this	  case	  differs	  significantly	  from	  the	  two	  offered	  above.	  As	  Elga	  himself	  points	  out:	  “the	  abortion	  case	  is	  quite	  different	  than	  the	  multiplication	  case.”	  (Elga,	  2007)	  My	  current	  purpose	  is	  to	  ask	  how	  the	  cases	  differ,	  and	  then	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  difference	  -­‐-­‐	  while	  it	  may	  affect	  what	  we	  take	  the	  proper	  epistemic	  response	  to	  be	  in	  cases	  of	  either	  kind10	  -­‐-­‐	  should	  not	  automatically	  disqualify	  
Politics-­‐type	  cases	  from	  arising	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers.	  	   In	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  informally	  offered	  a	  case	  that	  I	  take	  to	  be	  structurally	  similar	  to	  Politics.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  of	  the	  religious	  believer	  and	  the	  naturalist.	  Let’s	  modify	  formalize	  this	  case	  for	  ease	  of	  reference:	  
Grandeur:	  You	  and	  I	  are	  standing	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  Grand	  Canyon.	  Looking	  out	  over	  the	  expanse,	  I	  declare	  that	  the	  immensity	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  side	  note	  that	  this	  case	  is	  actually	  offered	  by	  Elga	  in	  the	  course	  of	  his	  resolution	  to	  the	  tension	  I	  raised	  in	  section	  I.	  According	  to	  Elga,	  we	  must	  respond	  “no”	  to	  the	  rhetorical	  questions	  asked	  here.	  Beth	  and	  Ann	  cannot	  consider	  each	  other	  epistemic	  peers,	  and	  this	  is	  because	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  disagree	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  cluster	  of	  issues	  (and,	  thus,	  they	  will	  both	  appear	  to	  have	  gotten	  things	  wrong	  from	  within	  their	  respective	  perspectives).	  I	  will	  specifically	  address	  this	  aspect	  of	  Elga’s	  dialectic	  in	  the	  concluding	  sections	  of	  this	  paper.	  10	  The	  rational	  response	  required	  of	  me	  in	  light	  of	  evidence	  that	  I	  may	  have	  committed	  a	  calculative	  error	  will	  likely	  involve	  reducing	  my	  confidence	  in	  the	  beliefs	  affected,	  carefully	  attempting	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  source	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  error,	  etc.	  Responding	  to	  dispositional	  errors,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  will	  require	  me	  to	  make	  (possibly	  significant)	  revisions	  to	  my	  set	  of	  evidential	  dispositions.	  If	  disagreement	  serves	  as	  evidence	  of	  error	  (as	  many	  epistemologists	  believe),	  the	  rational	  responses	  required	  by	  these	  different	  types	  of	  disagreement	  will	  likely	  be	  radically	  different.	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grandeur	  of	  this	  natural	  phenomenon	  must	  have	  been	  designed;	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  natural	  beauty	  on	  this	  scale	  suggests	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  designer	  or	  creator.	  You,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  disagree.	  While	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  experience	  supports	  my	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  creator,	  you	  take	  it	  that	  the	  immensity	  and	  grandeur	  evinces	  no	  such	  thing.	  (In	  fact,	  you	  may	  have	  evolutionary	  explanations	  ready	  to	  explain	  why	  you	  think	  this.)	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  experience	  I	  think	  it	  somewhat	  likely	  that	  God	  exists,	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  experience	  you	  disagree.	  	   Consider	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  cases:	  in	  Mental	  Math	  you	  and	  I	  disagree	  because	  of	  a	  simple	  calculative	  error.	  If	  we	  took	  the	  time	  to	  recalculate,	  step	  by	  step,	  the	  portions	  of	  the	  bill	  that	  we	  were	  each	  responsible	  for,	  one	  of	  us	  would	  presumably	  stop	  at	  one	  of	  the	  steps	  to	  say	  something	  like,	  “Of	  course,	  I	  was	  dividing	  by	  the	  wrong	  number!”	  In	  Grandeur,	  there	  is	  no	  parallel	  to	  this	  method	  of	  resolution.	  Laying	  out	  our	  reasoning	  processes	  would	  only	  make	  explicit	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  disposed	  to	  treat	  the	  grandeur	  as	  evidence	  of	  God’s	  existence,	  while	  you	  are	  not	  disposed	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  we	  might	  say,	  “Ah,	  so	  that	  is	  why	  we	  disagree!”	  but	  this	  discovery	  would	  not	  in	  itself	  resolve	  our	  dispute	  (as	  it	  would	  Mental	  Math).	  This	  case	  is	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  we	  have	  been	  calling	  “deep”	  disagreement	  up	  until	  this	  point.	  Because	  such	  cases	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  way	  in	  what	  two	  agents	  are	  “disposed”	  to	  treat	  as	  evidentially	  significant,	  from	  now	  on	  let’s	  refer	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  disagreement	  as	  “dispositional	  disagreement.”	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   Of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  dispositional	  disagreements	  are	  epistemically	  significant.	  Grandeur,	  while	  recognizably	  parallel	  to	  Mental	  Math	  in	  certain	  respects,	  is	  messier.	  For	  one	  thing,	  that	  we	  are	  epistemic	  peers	  in	  (though	  this	  relationship	  itself	  is	  subject	  to	  much	  debate)	  is	  not	  as	  obvious	  in	  Grandeur	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  calculative	  case.	  	   Now,	  it	  is	  possible	  (and	  my	  cases	  here	  may	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  likely)	  that	  this	  difference	  will	  itself	  always	  involve	  some	  sort	  of	  error.	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  perhaps	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  either	  Ann	  or	  Beth	  possesses	  faulty	  evidential	  dispositions	  (say,	  to	  treat	  certain	  groupings	  of	  cells	  as	  possessing	  the	  same	  moral	  status	  as	  biologically	  independent	  human	  beings).	  It	  might	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  I	  ought	  not	  to	  treat	  “religious	  seemings”	  as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  theism.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  two	  objections	  to	  my	  analysis	  loom:	  1)	  “dispositional	  disagreements”	  (that	  is,	  disagreements	  grounded	  in	  differences	  of	  dispositions	  rather	  than	  calculative	  errors)	  will	  be	  ultimately	  reducible	  to	  “calculative	  disagreements,”	  and	  we	  will	  have	  to	  treat	  the	  different	  cases	  in	  generally	  the	  same	  way,	  or	  2)	  “dispositional	  disagreements”	  will	  never	  arise	  between	  epistemic	  peers,	  since	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  disputants	  in	  such	  a	  disagreement	  will	  always	  have	  a	  superior	  disposition.	  	   I	  raise	  these	  objections	  just	  to	  postpone	  discussion	  of	  them	  until	  section	  IV.	  There	  we	  consider	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  plausible	  conditions	  on	  epistemic	  peerhood	  will	  rule	  out	  the	  types	  of	  cases	  I’m	  interested	  in.11	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  though,	  that	  I	  will	  take	  these	  objections	  very	  seriously.	  Indeed,	  my	  desire	  to	  offer	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  take	  it	  that	  my	  argument	  will	  not	  depend	  on	  any	  controversial	  assumptions	  about	  this	  relationship,	  however,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  that	  arise	  when	  we	  try	  to	  more	  systematically	  define	  this	  relationship.	  For	  a	  recent	  attempt	  to	  make	  some	  of	  these	  problems	  explicit,	  see	  (Gelfert,	  2011).	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proper	  response	  to	  them	  will	  inform	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  next	  few	  sections	  of	  the	  paper.	  In	  outline:	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  peerhood,	  as	  a	  relationship	  predicated	  on	  parity	  of	  epistemic	  ability	  (no	  matter	  how	  this	  is	  construed12),	  will	  not	  directly	  depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  disputants	  share	  the	  relevant	  set	  (or	  subset)	  of	  evidential	  dispositions.	  This	  will	  become	  apparent	  as	  we	  further	  examine	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  dispositions	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  and	  ask	  questions	  about	  how	  they	  can	  come	  to	  be	  acquired.	  I	  will	  then	  go	  on	  to	  resolve	  the	  tension	  offered	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper	  by	  means	  of	  my	  distinction,	  and	  show	  why	  doing	  so	  is	  preferable	  to	  any	  positions	  currently	  on	  offer.	  	   Before	  that,	  though,	  one	  final	  (less	  controversial)	  case	  of	  a	  dispositional	  disagreement:	  
Theft:	  You	  and	  I	  are	  detectives	  interrogating	  bank	  employees	  suspected	  of	  a	  small	  theft.	  After	  we	  finish	  questioning	  a	  very	  nervous	  teller,	  you	  turn	  to	  me.	  “There’s	  our	  man,”	  you	  say.	  “Did	  you	  see	  how	  nervous	  he	  was?”	  I’m	  puzzled.	  If	  anything,	  I	  think,	  his	  nervousness	  seems	  to	  indicate	  his	  innocence	  (I	  take	  it	  small	  time	  criminals	  are	  fairly	  good	  at	  hiding	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  most	  obvious	  signs	  of	  guilt).	  Still,	  though	  we	  generally	  agree	  on	  who	  we	  take	  to	  be	  guilty	  in	  such	  cases,	  we’ve	  each	  been	  right	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  times	  when	  we	  disagree.	  After	  thoroughly	  discussing	  the	  case	  you	  maintain	  confidence	  in	  your	  belief	  and	  I	  remain	  skeptical.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  define	  this	  ability	  in	  the	  externalist	  sense	  of	  reliably	  arriving	  at	  the	  right	  answer,	  with	  (Elga,	  2007;	  especially	  footnote	  21),	  or	  in	  more	  internalist	  sense	  of	  Christensen,	  Kelly,	  Gutting,	  et	  al,	  where	  epistemic	  ability	  is	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  possessing	  relevant	  epistemic	  virtues	  like	  perspicacity,	  intelligence,	  diligence,	  and	  so	  on.	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The	  case	  shares	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  other	  (more	  controversial)	  cases,	  but	  is	  less	  polarizing	  because	  readers	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  the	  table	  with	  commitments	  that	  will	  bear	  on	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  either	  of	  these	  agents	  must	  be	  a	  “better	  detective”	  (and	  superior	  epistemic	  agent)	  than	  the	  other.	  	   With	  this	  distinction	  drawn,	  then,	  and	  with	  our	  cases	  in	  hand,	  let’s	  begin	  to	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  dispositional	  disagreement	  can	  even	  arise	  between	  epistemic	  peers	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  We	  will	  go	  about	  this,	  first,	  by	  considering	  more	  closely	  the	  nature	  of	  epistemic	  dispositions,	  and	  then,	  by	  asking	  questions	  as	  to	  how	  agents	  come	  to	  acquire	  the	  actual	  set	  of	  dispositions	  that	  they	  possess	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  If	  I	  am	  right,	  and	  the	  totality	  of	  an	  agent’s	  set	  of	  dispositions	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  her	  epistemic	  abilities	  (or	  these	  abilities	  alone),	  then	  we	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  provide	  a	  satisfying	  response	  to	  the	  major	  objection	  to	  my	  analysis	  raised	  in	  this	  section.	  From	  there,	  we	  will	  return	  to	  the	  question	  raised	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  paper,	  and	  review	  ground	  covered.	  	  
III.	  On	  The	  Nature	  of	  Evidential	  Dispositions	  	   At	  any	  given	  time,	  I	  am	  privy	  to	  an	  extensive	  set	  of	  data	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  deliberation	  about	  particular	  questions.	  When	  I	  infer	  that	  I	  am	  alone	  in	  my	  apartment,	  it	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sense	  data	  (I	  don’t	  hear	  anyone	  else	  walking	  around),	  data	  provided	  by	  my	  memory	  (I	  remember	  my	  wife	  leaving	  and	  no	  one	  else	  entering	  the	  apartment),	  and	  so	  on.	  Similarly,	  when	  I	  deliberate	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  are	  telling	  me	  the	  truth,	  it	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  how	  nervous	  you	  appear,	  what	  motivations	  you	  might	  have	  to	  lie	  to	  me,	  facts	  indicative	  of	  your	  character,	  etc.	  The	  term	  “data”	  here	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  theoretically	  innocuous:	  data	  just	  refers	  to	  whatever	  it	  is	  –	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considerations,	  facts,	  states	  of	  affairs	  –	  that	  make	  up	  the	  raw	  materials	  of	  deliberation.	  	   Of	  course,	  which	  data	  ought	  to	  count	  as	  evidentially	  significant	  in	  a	  given	  case	  and	  which	  data	  ought	  not	  to	  figure	  into	  our	  deliberation	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  I	  typically	  don’t	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sky	  is	  blue	  to	  have	  any	  bearing	  whatsoever	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  had	  spaghetti	  for	  dinner	  last	  night;	  the	  two	  things	  are	  evidentially	  unrelated.	  Similarly,	  I	  don’t	  consider	  apparent	  design	  in	  nature	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  God’s	  existence,	  though	  I	  recognize	  that	  some	  people	  (perhaps	  reasonably)	  do.	  The	  question	  I’d	  like	  to	  briefly	  consider	  in	  this	  section	  is	  this:	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  disposed	  to	  treat	  some	  data	  as	  evidentially	  significant,	  what	  role	  do	  these	  dispositions	  play	  in	  our	  reasoning,	  and	  how	  do	  we	  order	  or	  structure	  these	  dispositions	  so	  that	  they	  can	  play	  this	  role.	  We’ll	  start	  with	  the	  first	  question.	  	   Evidential	  dispositions	  determine	  what	  types	  of	  data	  count	  as	  evidence	  and	  in	  what	  way.	  They	  are	  usually	  so	  ingrained	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  our	  reasoning	  that	  they	  take	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  givenness;	  if	  there	  are	  fingerprints	  on	  the	  weapon	  at	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  murder	  that	  match	  Frank’s	  fingerprints,	  this	  is	  evidence	  (perhaps	  good	  or	  conclusive	  evidence)	  that	  Frank	  is	  the	  murderer.	  The	  testimony	  of	  experts	  is	  evidence	  of	  those	  propositions	  to	  which	  they	  testify.	  Expressions	  of	  such	  individual	  dispositions	  take	  the	  form	  “X	  counts	  as	  evidence	  of	  Y	  in	  circumstances	  C,”	  where	  X	  is	  some	  raw	  data	  or	  datum,	  Y	  is	  a	  proposition	  that	  X	  evidentially	  supports,	  and	  C	  are	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  X	  and	  Y	  stand	  in	  this	  relation	  of	  evidential	  support.	  “Testimony	  counts	  as	  evidence	  of	  propositions	  asserted	  by	  the	  testifier	  when	  offered	  by	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honest	  testifiers”	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  this	  form,13	  as	  is	  the	  expression	  “Visual	  perceptions	  
count	  as	  evidence	  of	  propositions	  about	  external	  objects	  in	  ordinary	  perceptual	  
circumstances.”	  	   Individuals	  will,	  of	  course,	  have	  many	  such	  dispositions,	  since	  none	  of	  the	  individual	  dispositions	  will	  themselves	  be	  general	  enough	  to	  account	  for	  all	  the	  various	  data	  that	  we	  encounter	  in	  the	  course	  of	  everyday	  life.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  things	  we	  can	  say	  about	  the	  collection	  or	  set	  of	  these	  dispositions,	  then,	  that	  will	  be	  of	  interest	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper.	  The	  first	  thing	  is	  that	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  requirement	  of	  rationality	  that	  this	  set	  of	  dispositions	  is	  coherent;	  that	  is,	  an	  agent	  would	  be	  irrational	  if	  she	  held	  two	  conflicting	  dispositions.	  How	  can	  dispositions	  come	  into	  conflict?	  There	  are	  two	  ways.	  Consider	  first	  two	  dispositions	  that	  conflict	  in	  principle:	  1)	  the	  testimony	  of	  experts	  count	  as	  evidence	  of	  that	  to	  which	  they	  testify	  in	  normal	  circumstances,	  and	  2)	  the	  testimony	  of	  experts	  count	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  negation	  of	  that	  two	  which	  they	  testify	  in	  normal	  circumstances.	  Of	  course,	  no	  one	  would	  ever	  hold	  two	  dispositions	  so	  blatantly	  contradictory,	  but	  there	  are	  subtler	  ways	  for	  dispositions	  to	  conflict	  in	  principle,	  and	  this	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  the	  set	  of	  our	  evidential	  dispositions	  could	  come	  into	  conflict.	  	   The	  second	  way	  that	  evidential	  dispositions	  can	  come	  into	  conflict	  is	  best	  illustrated	  by	  means	  of	  an	  example.	  Consider	  two	  very	  basic	  dispositions:	  1)	  the	  testimony	  of	  my	  close	  friends	  counts	  as	  conclusive	  evidence	  regarding	  which	  events	  have	  happened	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  2)	  nothing	  counts	  as	  evidence	  if	  it	  conflicts	  with	  the	  basic	  physical	  laws	  of	  nature.	  Now,	  if	  I	  have	  both	  of	  these	  evidential	  dispositions,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Of	  course,	  there	  will	  be	  some	  other	  reasonable	  ceteris	  paribus	  conditions	  at	  work	  in	  this	  and	  other	  such	  dispositions	  (i.e.	  “and	  the	  testifier	  is	  not	  drunk	  or	  tired	  or	  under	  extreme	  duress,”	  etc).	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and	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  mine	  comes	  rushing	  up	  to	  me	  to	  testify	  that	  a	  physically	  impossible	  event	  has	  just	  occurred,	  I	  am	  faced	  with	  a	  new	  sort	  of	  conflict	  (one	  distinct	  from	  the	  conflict	  offered	  above).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  conflict	  is	  not	  in	  principle	  between	  the	  two	  dispositions	  (I	  could	  have	  gotten	  through	  life	  without	  my	  friend	  ever	  having	  testified	  that	  such	  an	  event	  occurred),	  but	  it	  arises	  because	  two	  of	  my	  dispositions	  suggest	  incompatible	  evidential	  interpretations	  of	  the	  data	  that	  I	  have.	  	   We	  will	  have	  more	  to	  say	  about	  this	  second	  sort	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  subsequent	  sections	  (and	  the	  role	  such	  conflicts	  play	  in	  determining	  the	  total	  set	  of	  one’s	  evidential	  dispositions).	  For	  now,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  recognize:	  1)	  that	  individual	  evidential	  dispositions	  comprise	  a	  larger	  set	  in	  any	  actual	  agent,	  2)	  that	  rationality	  requires	  certain	  relations	  to	  hold	  between	  dispositions	  in	  this	  set	  (and	  thus	  that	  the	  dispositions	  are	  ordered	  in	  particular	  ways),	  and	  3)	  that	  this	  set	  will	  be	  determinate	  in	  any	  given	  agent	  (that	  is	  to	  say:	  this	  set	  will	  determine,	  for	  that	  agent	  and	  for	  any	  raw	  data,	  whether	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  that	  data	  ought	  to	  figure	  into	  her	  reasoning	  as	  evidence).	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  will	  build	  on	  this	  understanding	  of	  evidential	  dispositions	  (and	  the	  sets	  which	  they	  comprise)	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  objections	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  this	  paper.	  
IV.	  Do	  Peerhood	  Conditions	  Rule	  out	  Peer	  Dispositional	  Disagreements?	  	   Whether	  we	  take	  externalist	  conditions	  (such	  as	  reliability)	  or	  internalist	  conditions	  (such	  as	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  virtues)	  to	  be	  primary	  in	  questions	  of	  who	  is	  to	  count	  as	  standing	  in	  the	  peerhood	  relationship,	  this	  much	  is	  clear:	  epistemic	  peerhood	  is	  a	  relationship	  predicated	  on	  parity	  of	  agents’	  epistemic	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ability.14	  Specifically,	  what	  we	  talk	  about	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  peerhood	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  two	  individuals	  are	  generally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  evaluate	  evidence	  equally	  well.	  This	  general	  fact	  about	  how	  peerhood	  is	  often	  defined,	  however,	  might	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  concern	  about	  my	  distinction	  between	  dispositional	  and	  calculative	  disagreements.	  	  	   Suppose	  we	  grant	  that	  some	  disagreements	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  different	  evidential	  dispositions.	  We	  might	  still	  think	  that	  disagreements	  between	  epistemic	  peers,	  qua	  peers,	  could	  never	  be	  grounded	  in	  differences	  of	  evidential	  dispositions.	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  the	  second	  objection	  that	  I	  raised	  in	  section	  two.	  The	  objection	  gains	  traction	  because	  it	  is	  prima	  facie	  plausibly	  a	  condition	  of	  epistemic	  peerhood	  that	  the	  agents	  share	  evidential	  dispositions.	  According	  to	  this	  objection,	  I	  might	  disagree	  with	  someone	  who	  takes	  inexplicable	  lights	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  a	  UFO,	  but	  that	  is	  only	  possible	  because	  that	  person	  is	  poorly	  evidentially	  disposed;	  if	  they	  were	  my	  epistemic	  peer,	  this	  disagreement	  would	  fail	  to	  arise	  because	  they	  would	  not	  be	  disposed	  in	  this	  way.	  The	  argument	  for	  this	  objection	  might	  look	  something	  like	  this:	  1. Two	  people	  are	  epistemic	  peers	  only	  if	  they	  share	  the	  relevant	  evidential	  dispositions	  2. If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  dispositional	  disagreements	  cannot	  arise	  between	  epistemic	  peers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  With	  this	  claim	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  critique	  can	  remain	  agnostic	  as	  to	  which	  conditions,	  externalist	  or	  internalist,	  are	  ultimately	  primary	  in	  considerations	  of	  peerhood,	  and	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Christensen	  and	  others	  remain	  agnostic	  by	  suggesting	  that	  peerhood	  obtains	  in	  certain	  cases	  by	  pointing	  out	  in	  cases	  where	  “when	  we’ve	  disagreed	  in	  the	  past	  we	  each	  been	  right	  equally	  frequently”	  (see	  Mental	  Math	  above	  (Christensen,	  2011)).	  Here,	  Christensen	  points	  to	  reliability,	  a	  condition	  all	  parties	  will	  agree	  is	  necessary	  for	  peerhood,	  but	  does	  not	  decide	  whether	  the	  disputants	  are	  peers	  
because	  of	  this	  reliability,	  or	  whether	  the	  reliability	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  relevant	  epistemic	  virtues.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  claim	  is	  ecumenical	  across	  the	  most	  frequently	  cited	  definitions	  of	  peerhood.	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3. Thus,	  dispositional	  disagreements	  will	  not	  arise	  between	  epistemic	  peers	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that,	  if	  predication	  of	  peerhood	  requires	  disputants	  to	  share	  evidential	  dispositions,	  then	  the	  type	  of	  disagreement	  that	  I	  think	  epistemologists	  of	  disagreement	  should	  consider	  just	  won’t	  ever	  arise	  for	  epistemic	  peers.	  	   But	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  false.	  This	  is	  because,	  however	  we	  interpret	  “relevant	  evidential	  dispositions,”	  the	  set	  of	  an	  agent’s	  evidential	  dispositions	  (her	  “dispositional	  set”	  as	  I	  will	  call	  them)	  is	  never	  wholly	  determined	  by	  that	  agent’s	  epistemic	  abilities.	  Thus,	  epistemic	  peers,	  i.e.	  agents	  of	  equal	  epistemic	  ability,	  can	  fail	  to	  share	  the	  “relevant	  evidential	  dispositions,”	  and	  premise	  one	  is	  false.	  	   According	  to	  the	  objection,	  in	  order	  for	  two	  agents	  to	  be	  epistemic	  peers,	  they	  must	  possess	  identical	  sets	  of	  relevant	  evidential	  dispositions.	  We	  could	  read	  this	  as	  a	  very	  strong	  claim:	  no	  two	  agents	  whose	  sets	  include	  even	  a	  single	  different	  evidential	  disposition	  can	  be	  considered	  epistemic	  peers.	  But,	  this	  is	  surely	  too	  strong.15	  More	  charitably,	  let’s	  interpret	  the	  “relevant	  evidential	  dispositions”	  to	  mean	  the	  set	  of	  evidential	  dispositions	  relevant	  to	  the	  disagreement	  at	  hand.	  Though	  this	  is	  a	  weaker	  claim,	  it	  is	  still	  an	  implausible	  condition	  on	  epistemic	  peerhood.	  Here	  are	  a	  few	  reasons	  why.	  	   First	  of	  all,	  rational	  changes	  to	  the	  set	  of	  one’s	  evidential	  dispositions	  cannot	  always	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence.	  This	  is	  because	  evidential	  dispositions,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  I	  live	  in	  Minnesota,	  and	  have	  all	  my	  life.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  I	  possess	  an	  evidential	  disposition	  regarding	  what	  sorts	  of	  data	  about	  the	  weather	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  about	  to	  be	  heavy	  snowfall.	  When	  I	  meet	  an	  Arizonan	  who	  disagrees	  with	  me	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  have	  just	  made	  a	  logically	  invalid	  inference,	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  dispositional	  set	  includes	  dispositions	  about	  what	  data	  counts	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  impending	  blizzard	  will	  surely	  not	  disqualify	  us	  as	  epistemic	  peers	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand,	  even	  if	  she,	  having	  never	  experienced	  significant	  snowfall,	  fails	  to	  have	  any	  dispositions	  regarding	  this	  sort	  of	  data.	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the	  sets	  they	  comprise,	  are	  determinate	  about	  what	  is	  to	  count	  as	  evidence	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  But	  if	  any	  such	  changes	  can	  come	  about	  without	  requiring	  the	  agent	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  evidence,	  then,	  since	  the	  exercise	  of	  one’s	  epistemic	  abilities	  just	  consists	  in	  such	  evaluation,	  that	  agent’s	  dispositional	  set	  cannot	  be	  wholly	  determined	  by	  her	  epistemic	  abilities.	  Consider	  an	  instance	  of	  this	  type	  of	  change.	  	   Consider	  an	  instance	  of	  such	  a	  change.16	  Suppose,	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake,	  that	  the	  relevant	  subset	  of	  my	  evidential	  dispositions	  is	  just	  twofold:	  (1)	  propositions	  
that	  my	  friends	  assert	  are	  infallibly	  true,	  and	  (2)	  propositions	  of	  physically	  impossible	  
phenomena	  are	  all	  infallibly	  false.	  Now,	  suppose	  my	  friend	  comes	  up	  to	  me	  and	  asserts	  the	  following	  proposition:	  “I	  can	  breathe	  underwater.”	  According	  to	  (1),	  this	  proposition	  is	  to	  count	  as	  evidence	  that	  my	  friend	  really	  can	  breathe	  underwater	  (a	  physically	  impossible	  phenomenon).	  According	  to	  (2),	  however,	  I	  ought	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  proposition	  false	  (and,	  thus,	  that	  my	  friend	  really	  can’t	  breathe	  underwater).	  My	  dispositions	  here	  underdetermine	  how	  I	  should	  account	  for	  this	  piece	  of	  potentially	  evidentially	  significant	  data.	  Given	  the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  rationality	  will	  require	  our	  evidence	  to	  be	  coherent	  (i.e.	  that	  I	  cannot	  simply	  account	  for	  this	  data	  by	  considering	  it	  to	  be	  decisive	  evidence	  for	  incompatible	  propositions)	  I	  may	  well	  be	  required	  to	  make	  a	  change	  in	  the	  relevant	  subset	  of	  my	  dispositions.	  
How	  I	  should	  change	  my	  dispositions,	  however,	  cannot	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  evidence,	  since	  it	  is	  how	  the	  data	  is	  supposed	  to	  count	  as	  evidence	  in	  the	  first	  place	  that	  has	  been	  called	  into	  question.	  	  But	  if	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  I	  change	  my	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I	  owe	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  this	  argument	  to	  Michael	  Rea.	  See	  the	  Introduction	  of	  (Rea,	  2004).	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dispositional	  set	  cannot	  be	  determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence,	  then	  whatever	  change	  is	  ultimately	  made	  will	  not	  be	  determined	  by	  my	  epistemic	  abilities.	  And	  if	  peerhood	  is	  just	  predicated	  on	  parity	  of	  epistemic	  ability,	  then	  one’s	  dispositional	  set	  will	  not	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  two	  agents	  stand	  in	  the	  relationship	  of	  peerhood.17	  	   Secondly,	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  seem	  to	  acquire	  certain	  (perhaps	  all18)	  of	  our	  evidential	  dispositions	  non-­‐evaluatively.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  as	  a	  child	  I	  came	  to	  consider	  the	  noises	  in	  my	  house	  as	  night	  as	  data	  that	  was	  not	  evidentially	  indicative	  of	  danger.	  Most	  likely	  this	  is	  because	  my	  parents,	  a	  source	  of	  authoritative	  knowledge	  at	  that	  point,	  simply	  asserted	  that	  over	  and	  over.	  More	  recently,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  be	  convinced	  violence	  to	  pre-­‐theoretical	  intuitions	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  a	  metaphysical	  view	  is	  false.	  This	  disposition,	  too,	  is	  more	  likely	  the	  result	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  local	  discourse	  community	  that	  I	  find	  myself	  part	  of,	  and	  less	  likely	  the	  result	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  any	  of	  my	  epistemic	  abilities.	  	   Consider	  the	  following	  example,	  originally	  used	  by	  Kelly	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  context,	  offered	  by	  G.	  A.	  Cohen.	  According	  to	  Kelly,	  Cohen	  “notes	  that	  the	  Oxford	  trained	  philosophers	  of	  his	  generation	  are	  almost	  unanimously	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  I	  can	  see	  how	  the	  objector	  could	  reply	  to	  this	  point	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  “Okay,	  perhaps	  epistemic	  peerhood	  doesn’t	  depend	  on	  sharing	  evidential	  dispositions	  –	  but	  surely	  there	  is	  some	  most	  rational	  way	  of	  evaluating	  how	  you	  ought	  to	  change	  in	  the	  above	  case	  (on	  pain	  of	  epistemic	  relativism).	  Whatever	  characteristics	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  respond	  correctly	  in	  that	  way,	  then,	  those	  are	  required	  for	  predications	  of	  epistemic	  peerhood.”	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  argument.	  In	  fact,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  true.	  But	  I	  have	  already	  shown	  enough	  to	  defend	  myself	  from	  the	  objection	  that	  was	  raised.	  If	  there	  are	  other,	  perhaps	  non-­‐epistemic,	  characteristics	  that	  agents	  must	  share	  in	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  epistemic	  peers,	  we	  will	  need	  to	  spell	  these	  out	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  not	  as	  yet	  been	  considered	  in	  the	  literature.	  Considering	  what	  these	  other	  characteristics	  would	  be,	  then,	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  my	  distinction	  could	  require	  us	  to	  reorient	  the	  literature	  on	  disagreement.	  18	  For	  a	  parallel	  argument	  see	  (Rea,	  2004).	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opinion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  philosophically	  important	  distinction	  between	  analytic	  and	  synthetic	  truths.”	  (Kelly,	  2010;	  38)	  According	  to	  Cohen,	  though	  ...people	  of	  my	  generation	  who	  studied	  philosophy	  at	  Harvard	  rather	  than	  at	  Oxford	  for	  the	  most	  part	  reject	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction.	  And	  I	  can’t	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  an	  accident.	  That	  is,	  I	  can’t	  believe	  that	  Harvard	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  a	  place	  where	  both	  its	  leading	  thinker	  rejected	  that	  distinction	  and	  its	  graduate	  students,	  for	  independent	  reasons—merely,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  independent	  light	  of	  reason	  itself—also	  came	  to	  reject	  it.	  And	  vice	  versa,	  of	  course,	  for	  Oxford.	  I	  believe,	  rather,	  that	  in	  each	  case	  students	  were	  especially	  impressed	  by	  the	  reasons	  respectively	  for	  and	  against	  believing	  in	  the	  distinction,	  because	  in	  each	  case	  the	  reasons	  came	  with	  all	  the	  added	  persuasiveness	  of	  personal	  presentation,	  personal	  relationship,	  and	  so	  forth	  (p.18,	  emphasis	  is	  his).	  For	  our	  purposes,	  though,	  it	  is	  most	  remarkable	  to	  note	  how	  unlikely	  it	  is	  that	  the	  disagreement	  between	  the	  Oxford	  and	  Harvard	  trained	  philosophers	  had	  anything	  at	  all	  to	  do	  with	  epistemic	  ability.	  It	  would	  be	  incredible	  to	  suppose	  either:	  a)	  Oxford	  or	  Harvard	  philosophers	  of	  Cohen’s	  generation	  were	  systematically	  prone	  to	  calculative	  error	  regarding	  whether	  to	  accept	  the	  analytic/synthetic	  distinction,	  or	  b)	  the	  difference	  in	  evidential	  dispositions	  responsible	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  philosopher	  was	  disposed	  favorably	  toward	  the	  distinction	  was	  due	  (directly	  or	  indirectly)	  to	  epistemic	  ability.	  Probably	  these	  dispositions	  (i.e.	  to	  reject	  or	  accept	  this	  distinction)	  didn’t	  have	  the	  slightest	  thing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  epistemic	  abilities	  of	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those	  involved.	  Probably	  they	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  non-­‐epistemic	  elements	  Cohen	  cites	  (i.e.	  “the	  added	  persuasiveness	  of	  personal	  presentation,	  personal	  relationship,	  and	  so	  forth).19	  Even	  if	  this	  stronger	  claim	  is	  not	  true,	  however,	  all	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  the	  disagreement	  in	  question	  is	  both	  epistemically	  significant,	  and	  not	  grounded	  on	  obvious	  epistemic	  disparities.	  	   Because	  any	  given	  agent’s	  dispositional	  set	  will	  not	  be	  determined	  by	  considerations	  of	  epistemic	  ability	  alone,	  and	  because	  we	  can	  think	  of	  clear	  instances	  of	  epistemically	  significant	  dispositional	  disagreement	  need	  not	  involve	  epistemic	  disparities,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  objection	  raised	  in	  this	  section	  fails.	  For	  all	  we	  have	  shown,	  then,	  dispositional	  disagreements	  can	  be	  epistemically	  significant,	  and	  views	  that	  fail	  to	  consider	  them	  as	  such	  will	  be	  incomplete	  to	  this	  extent.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  views	  of	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  then	  consider	  in	  section	  VI	  whether	  their	  views	  will	  be	  suited	  to	  deal	  with	  dispositional	  disagreements.	  
V.	  Kelly’s	  Steadfast	  View	  and	  Christensen’s	  Conciliationism	  	   In	  the	  introduction,	  I	  sketched	  two	  simplistic	  responses	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  disagreement	  in	  order	  to	  illuminate	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  dialectic	  of	  my	  paper.	  Here,	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  two	  actual	  positions	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  broad	  categories	  that	  I	  introduced	  there.	  By	  arguing,	  over	  this	  section	  and	  the	  next,	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  positions	  takes	  seriously	  my	  distinction	  between	  calculative	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Whatever	  is	  at	  work	  in	  this	  case	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  work	  in	  a	  number	  of	  other	  cases	  that	  we	  pre-­‐theoretically	  take	  to	  be	  instances	  of	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreement:	  metaphysicians	  of	  various	  schools	  frequently	  disagree	  uniformly	  over	  whether	  and	  which	  types	  of	  intuitions	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  seriously,	  adherents	  to	  specific	  faith	  traditions	  often	  defend	  uniquely	  difficult	  doctrines	  against	  their	  opponents	  and	  systematically	  disagree	  about	  what	  parts	  of	  shared	  doctrine	  and	  scriptures	  count	  as	  evidence.	  Etc.	  
	   	   35	   	   	  
	   	  
dispositional	  disagreements	  (which	  I	  have	  now	  independently	  motivated),	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  why	  an	  alternative	  resolution	  to	  the	  main	  tension	  within	  the	  literature	  will	  put	  us	  in	  a	  better	  dialectical	  position.	  	  	   Here’s	  the	  way	  that	  Christensen	  characterizes	  the	  general	  state	  of	  the	  literature	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  two	  views	  that	  I	  will	  present	  in	  this	  section:	  Subtleties	  aside,	  a	  look	  at	  the	  topography	  of	  the	  disagreement	  debate	  reveals	  a	  major	  divide	  separating	  positions	  which	  are	  generally	  hospitable	  to	  maintaining	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disagreement,	  and	  positions	  which	  would	  mandate	  extensive	  revision	  to	  our	  opinions	  on	  many	  controversial	  matters...The	  fundamental	  theoretical	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  camps,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  lies	  in	  their	  differing	  attitudes	  toward	  evaluating	  the	  epistemic	  credentials	  of	  opinions	  voiced	  by	  people	  with	  whom	  one	  disagrees.	  (Christensen,	  Conciliationism	  1)	  Within	  this	  framework,	  Kelly’s	  account	  is	  of	  the	  sort	  “generally	  hospitable	  to	  maintaining	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  disagreement,”	  while	  Christensen’s	  would	  “mandate	  extensive	  revisions.”	  Following	  Christensen	  let’s	  call	  Kelly’s	  account	  “the	  steadfast	  view”	  (or	  just	  Steadfast)	  and	  Christensen’s	  “the	  conciliatory	  view”	  (Conciliationism).	  Before	  considering	  how	  these	  views	  differ,	  let’s	  briefly	  consider	  some	  broad	  similarities.	  	   Both	  views	  agree	  that	  disagreement	  generally	  constitutes	  “higher-­‐order	  evidence”	  when	  it	  is	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing	  peers.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  if	  two	  people	  of	  equal	  epistemic	  abilities	  evaluate	  the	  same	  “first-­‐order”	  evidence	  (e.g.	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meteorological	  or	  arithmetic	  data),	  they	  should	  come	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  When	  they	  don’t,	  they	  both	  have	  some	  (higher-­‐order)	  evidence	  that	  they	  have	  committed	  an	  epistemic	  error.	  Compare	  the	  case	  of	  peer	  disagreement	  to	  cases	  of	  instrumental	  failure	  (as	  many	  epistemologists	  do20):	  when	  our	  (historically	  equally	  reliable)	  watches	  read	  different	  times,	  you	  and	  I	  each	  have	  some	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  “it	  is	  
my	  watch	  that	  is	  malfunctioning.21”	  	   Here	  is	  Kelly’s	  helpful	  characterization	  of	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  and	  its	  epistemic	  function	  in	  disagreement:	  Given	  that	  reasonable	  individuals	  are	  disposed	  to	  respond	  correctly	  to	  their	  evidence,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  reasonable	  individual	  responds	  to	  her	  evidence	  in	  one	  way	  rather	  than	  another	  is	  itself	  evidence:	  it	  is	  evidence	  about	  her	  evidence.	  That	  is,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  (generally)	  reasonable	  individual	  believes	  hypothesis	  H	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  E	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  H	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  E.	  The	  beliefs	  of	  a	  reasonable	  individual	  will	  thus	  constitute	  higher-­‐order	  evidence,	  evidence	  about	  the	  character	  of	  her	  first-­‐order	  evidence.	  (Kelly,	  Epistemic	  Significance	  of	  Disagreement	  23-­‐24)	  Put	  simply:	  when	  a	  known	  peer	  of	  mine	  disagrees	  about	  some	  question	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  share	  evidence,	  her	  disagreement	  (given	  that	  she	  is	  my	  peer	  and,	  thus,	  equally	  likely	  to	  properly	  evaluate	  the	  evidence)	  serves	  as	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  instance	  (Kelly,	  2005)	  and	  (Kelly	  2010).	  For	  potential	  problems	  with	  this	  analogy	  see	  (Kelly	  2010),	  (White,	  2009),	  and	  (Enoch,	  2010).	  21	  Or,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  difference,	  perhaps	  we	  have	  evidence	  that	  “either	  my	  watch	  or	  your	  watch	  is	  malfunctioning.”	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  we	  both	  have	  some	  evidence,	  now,	  that	  a	  malfunction	  has	  occurred,	  and	  that	  this	  malfunction	  ought	  to	  figure	  into	  our	  reasoning	  process.	  Thanks	  to	  Cory	  Davia	  for	  clarifying	  this	  point,	  and	  several	  others	  throughout	  the	  paper.	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that	  I	  have	  made	  a	  mistake,	  just	  as	  my	  disagreement	  serves	  as	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  for	  her	  that	  she	  has	  made	  a	  mistake.	  	  	   This,	  then,	  is	  where	  the	  accounts	  –	  and	  the	  camps	  they	  represent	  –	  agree:	  disagreement	  is	  epistemically	  significant	  insofar	  as	  it	  serves	  disagreeing	  peers	  as	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  their	  own	  epistemic	  failure.22	  Here	  is	  the	  question	  that	  we	  will	  pursue	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section:	  what	  is,	  in	  Christensen’s	  words,	  the	  “fundamental	  theoretical	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  camps?”	  	   In	  order	  to	  illuminate	  the	  difference	  between	  Steadfast	  and	  Conciliationism,	  consider	  how	  we	  determine	  who	  our	  epistemic	  peers	  are.	  If	  I	  find	  you	  consistently	  arguing	  for	  outlandish	  positions	  on	  the	  basis	  of,	  what	  appears	  to	  me	  to	  be,	  extremely	  basic	  logical	  fallacies,	  I	  will	  refuse	  to	  recognize	  you	  as	  my	  epistemic	  peer.	  Similarly,	  if	  our	  disagreements	  are	  almost	  always	  eventually	  resolved	  in	  your	  favor,	  I	  might	  come	  to	  see	  you	  as	  an	  epistemic	  superior	  rather	  than	  as	  my	  peer.	  Clearly,	  then,	  past	  disagreements	  will	  figure	  as	  evidence	  when	  I	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  and	  I	  are	  epistemic	  peers	  (and,	  thus,	  what	  I	  ought	  to	  do	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  and	  I	  currently	  disagree).	  The	  basic	  question	  dividing	  Steadfast	  from	  Conciliationism,	  then,	  is	  whether	  our	  current	  disagreement	  can	  itself	  count	  as	  evidence	  when	  we	  are	  “evaluating	  the	  epistemic	  credentials	  of	  opinions	  voiced	  by	  people	  with	  whom	  one	  disagrees”	  (Christensen,	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Consider	  this	  representative	  quote	  from	  Christensen:	  “Sometimes,	  however,	  evidence	  rationalizes	  a	  change	  of	  belief	  precisely	  because	  it	  indicates	  that	  my	  former	  beliefs	  were	  rationally	  sub-­‐par.	  This	  is	  evidence	  of	  my	  own	  rational	  failure.	  If	  I	  learn	  that	  I’ve	  been	  systematically	  too	  optimistic	  in	  my	  weather	  predictions,	  I	  may	  also	  be	  rationally	  required	  to	  decrease	  my	  credence	  in	  fair	  weather	  tomorrow.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  indication	  that	  my	  former	  beliefs	  are	  suboptimal	  is	  no	  mere	  byproduct	  of	  my	  reasoning	  about	  the	  weather.	  What	  I	  learn	  bears	  on	  meteorological	  matters	  only	  via	  indicating	  my	  rational	  failings...”	  (Christensen,	  2010).	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   Steadfast	  theorists	  answer	  this	  question	  affirmatively:	  if	  you	  and	  I	  have	  generally	  agreed	  in	  the	  past	  (and,	  overall,	  seem	  equally	  reliable),	  but	  suddenly	  find	  ourselves	  disagreeing	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  earth	  is	  flat,	  it	  would	  be	  perfectly	  permissible,	  according	  to	  the	  Steadfastian,	  for	  me	  to	  demote	  you	  from	  epistemic	  peerhood	  on	  this	  basis.	  Conciliationists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  require	  adherence	  to	  the	  strict	  principle	  that	  questions	  of	  peerhood	  must	  be	  considered	  independent	  of	  the	  disagreement	  at	  hand.	  This	  principle,	  simply	  referred	  to	  as	  Independence	  in	  the	  literature,	  has	  become	  the	  sticking	  point	  between	  these	  two	  general	  positions.23	  	   Let	  me	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  two	  reasons	  why	  it	  makes	  dialectical	  sense	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  views	  of	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  in	  this	  paper:	  1)	  their	  exchange	  is	  clear	  and	  rigorous,	  and	  has	  been	  profoundly	  influential	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  disagreement.24	  2)	  It	  is	  often	  thought	  that	  these	  views	  stand	  at	  opposite	  ends	  of	  a	  spectrum	  representing	  the	  logical	  space	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  accounts	  of	  disagreement	  to	  inhabit.25	  Generally	  speaking,	  then,	  problems	  that	  affect	  both	  of	  these	  accounts	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  problems	  for	  the	  literature	  at	  large.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  (Christensen,	  2011)	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  Independence,	  which	  he	  formalizes	  as:	  “In	  evaluating	  the	  epistemic	  credentials	  of	  another	  person’s	  belief	  about	  P,	  to	  determine	  how	  (if	  at	  all)	  to	  modify	  one’s	  own	  belief	  about	  P,	  one	  should	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  one’s	  own	  initial	  belief	  about	  P.”	  For	  other	  treatments	  of	  
Independence	  see	  (Kelly,	  2005)	  and	  (Feldman,	  2006).	  24	  Kelly’s	  2005	  paper	  on	  disagreement	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  seminal	  to	  the	  contemporary	  debate,	  and	  Christensen	  offers	  the	  broadest	  treatments	  of	  conciliatory	  views.	  25	  “Contemporary	  responses	  to	  this	  issue	  may	  be	  roughly	  arrayed	  along	  a	  spectrum.	  At	  one	  end	  are	  views	  on	  which	  the	  disagreement	  of	  others	  should	  typically	  cause	  one	  to	  be	  much	  less	  confident	  in	  one’s	  belief	  than	  one	  would	  be	  otherwise	  –	  at	  least	  when	  those	  others	  seem	  just	  as	  intelligent,	  well-­‐informed,	  honest,	  free	  from	  bias,	  etc.	  as	  oneself.	  Following	  Elga	  (forthcoming),	  I’ll	  label	  this	  the	  ‘Conciliatory’	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  are	  views	  on	  which	  one	  may	  typically,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  infrequently,	  maintain	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  others	  who	  believe	  otherwise,	  even	  if	  those	  others	  seem	  one’s	  equals	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  qualifications	  listed	  above.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  the	  ‘Steadfast’	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.”	  (Christensen,	  Disagreement	  as	  Evidence)	  And	  Kelly:	  “We	  might	  picture	  these	  possibilities	  as	  constituting	  a	  spectrum:	  at	  one	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  sits	  The	  Equal	  Weight	  View;	  at	  the	  other	  end,	  The	  No	  Independent	  Weight	  View;	  in	  between,	  the	  more	  moderate	  alternatives,	  arranged	  by	  how	  much	  weight	  they	  would	  have	  one	  give	  to	  the	  opinion	  of	  a	  peer	  relative	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VI.	  How	  the	  Literature	  has	  Excluded	  Dispositional	  Cases	  	   It	  is	  my	  purpose	  in	  this	  section	  to	  show	  that	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  are	  both	  committed	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  epistemology	  of	  disagreement	  is	  solely	  concerned	  with	  calculative	  disagreements.	  I	  will	  argue	  directly	  for	  this	  conclusion	  by	  considering	  a	  presupposition	  endorsed	  by	  both	  philosophers	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  dispositional	  disagreements.	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  for	  this	  claim	  indirectly	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  every	  case	  offered	  within	  their	  exchange	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  calculative	  disagreement.	  	   According	  to	  Kelly:	  It	  is	  a	  presupposition	  of	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion	  that	  we	  are	  fallible	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  correctly	  appreciate	  our	  evidence.	  Of	  course,	  reasonable	  individuals	  are	  disposed	  to	  respond	  correctly	  to	  their	  evidence.	  But	  even	  generally	  reasonable	  individuals	  are	  susceptible	  to	  making	  mistakes	  on	  particular	  occasions.	  (Kelly,	  2005)	  This	  presupposition,	  by	  itself,	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  claim	  that	  I	  am	  arguing	  for	  here.	  It	  would	  if	  he	  had	  specified	  that	  the	  “mistakes”	  manifesting	  the	  “fallibility”	  of	  “generally	  reasonable	  individuals”	  were	  calculative	  in	  principle,	  but	  since	  Kelly	  (along	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  contemporary	  epistemologists)	  fails	  to	  recognize	  a	  distinction	  between	  calculative	  and	  dispositional	  mistakes,	  he	  does	  not	  clarify	  which	  kind	  of	  mistake	  (and	  thus	  what	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  fallibility)	  is	  being	  presupposed	  in	  discussions	  about	  disagreement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  to	  one’s	  own.	  The	  more	  weight	  one	  is	  required	  to	  give	  to	  a	  peer’s	  opinion	  relative	  to	  one’s	  own,	  the	  more	  the	  view	  in	  question	  will	  resemble	  The	  Equal	  Weight	  View;	  the	  less	  weight	  one	  is	  required	  to	  give,	  the	  more	  it	  will	  resemble	  The	  No	  Independent	  Weight	  View.”	  (Kelly,	  2010)	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   We	  do,	  however,	  get	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  fallibility	  that	  Kelly	  has	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  claims	  that:	  In	  principle,	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  give	  due	  weight	  to	  the	  available	  reasons	  that	  support	  a	  given	  view,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  actual	  defenders	  of	  the	  view	  who	  take	  those	  reasons	  as	  compelling.	  But	  in	  practice,	  the	  case	  for	  a	  view	  is	  apt	  to	  get	  short	  shrift	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  actual	  defenders...But	  the	  case	  for	  a	  given	  view	  itself	  is	  no	  stronger	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  view	  has	  actual	  defenders	  (Kelly,	  2010)	  Here,	  in	  addition	  to	  making	  the	  claim	  that	  disagreement	  provides	  a	  type	  of	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  that	  does	  not	  essentially	  involve	  the	  disagreement	  (after	  all,	  we	  could	  just	  as	  easily	  get	  evidence	  of	  our	  calculative	  error	  by	  considering	  math	  problems	  more	  carefully,	  or	  by	  using	  a	  calculator	  to	  check	  our	  work),	  Kelly	  is	  committing	  himself	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  cannot,	  in	  principle,	  be	  dispositional.	  Here	  is	  a	  formalized	  argument	  to	  support	  this	  claim:	  1. According	  to	  Kelly,	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  able,	  in	  principle,	  to	  give	  due	  weight	  to	  all	  of	  the	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  questions	  that	  ground	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  without	  ever	  having	  encountered	  any	  peers	  that	  actually	  disagree	  with	  us	  2. It	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  give	  due	  weight	  to	  all	  of	  the	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  questions	  that	  ground	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  without	  ever	  having	  encountered	  any	  peers	  that	  actually	  disagree	  with	  us	  if	  such	  a	  disagreement	  were	  dispositional	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3. Thus,	  according	  to	  Kelly,	  dispositional	  disagreements	  are	  not	  epistemically	  significant	  	   Let’s	  consider	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  this	  argument.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that,	  in	  cases	  of	  mere	  calculative	  disagreement,	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  give	  the	  evidence	  its	  weight	  all	  by	  ourselves.	  In	  Mental	  Math,	  I	  could	  have	  done	  the	  math	  problem	  much	  more	  slowly,	  checked	  and	  double-­‐checked	  my	  answer,	  and	  written	  out	  my	  work	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  I	  didn’t	  make	  a	  mistake.	  Surely	  practical	  considerations	  will	  prevent	  us	  from	  actually	  giving	  due	  weight	  to	  all	  of	  our	  evidence	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  questions	  of	  calculative	  disagreement,	  but	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  we	  couldn’t	  have	  done	  so	  in	  
principle.	  Now	  consider	  how	  things	  are	  different	  with	  respect	  to	  dispositional	  disagreements.	  If	  you	  and	  I	  possess	  different	  dispositions	  toward	  some	  body	  of	  evidentially	  significant	  data,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  how	  carefully	  I	  am	  regarding	  my	  evaluation	  of	  the	  data,	  I	  will	  never	  actually	  be	  able	  to	  anticipate	  the	  disagreement	  without	  reference	  to	  your	  particular	  disposition.	  	   In	  Christensen’s	  case,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  see	  how	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  he	  formulates	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  disagreement	  rule	  out	  dispositional	  disagreement	  as	  evidentially	  significant.	  Conciliationism,	  Christensen	  says:	  [Conciliationism]	  begins	  with	  two	  thoughts:	  that	  the	  peer’s	  disagreement	  gives	  one	  evidence	  that	  one	  has	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  interpreting	  the	  original	  evidence,	  and	  that	  such	  evidence	  should	  diminish	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  P.	  (Christensen,	  2011)	  Mistakes	  in	  how	  one	  “interprets	  evidence”	  presuppose	  shared	  evidential	  dispositions.	  To	  further	  illustrate	  Christensen’s	  commitment,	  consider	  his	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characterization	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  failures	  evidenced	  by	  the	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  disagreement	  affords:	  Sometimes,	  however,	  evidence	  rationalizes	  a	  change	  of	  belief	  precisely	  because	  it	  indicates	  that	  my	  former	  beliefs	  were	  rationally	  sub-­‐par.	  This	  is	  evidence	  of	  my	  own	  rational	  failure.	  If	  I	  learn	  that	  I’ve	  been	  systematically	  too	  optimistic	  in	  my	  weather	  predictions,	  I	  may	  also	  be	  rationally	  required	  to	  decrease	  my	  credence	  in	  fair	  weather	  tomorrow.	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  indication	  that	  my	  former	  beliefs	  are	  suboptimal	  is	  no	  mere	  byproduct	  of	  my	  reasoning	  about	  the	  weather.	  What	  I	  learn	  bears	  on	  meteorological	  matters	  only	  via	  indicating	  my	  rational	  failings...	  (Christensen,	  2010)	  Rational	  failure	  here,	  as	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  example	  offered,	  means	  calculative	  error.	  And	  if	  there	  is	  any	  doubt	  about	  this,	  we	  need	  only	  consider	  the	  cases	  of	  disagreement	  that	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  consider.	  	   I	  will	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  skeptical	  reader	  to	  actually	  consider	  each	  of	  the	  examples	  offered	  by	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  (and	  by	  epistemologists	  of	  disagreement	  generally).	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  identify	  every	  single	  one	  of	  these	  cases	  –	  disagreements	  about	  the	  winner	  of	  a	  horse	  race,	  disputes	  about	  restaurant	  bills,	  differences	  in	  what	  hypothesis	  some	  body	  of	  evidence	  confirms	  –	  are	  all	  instances	  of	  calculative	  disagreement.	  Indeed,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  problem	  I	  am	  critiquing	  here	  probably	  originally	  arose	  because	  of	  the	  obvious	  epistemic	  parity	  at	  work	  in	  cases	  of	  calculative	  disagreement,	  and	  in	  the	  consequent	  uniform	  selection	  of	  such	  cases	  by	  epistemologists.	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   In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Steadfast	  and	  
Conciliationism	  is	  itself	  a	  dispositional	  disagreement.	  This	  is	  because	  Independence	  is	  a	  principle	  about	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	  count	  as	  evidence	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (and	  is,	  thus,	  an	  expression	  of	  an	  evidential	  disposition),	  and	  because	  Independence	  is	  what	  grounds	  the	  disagreement	  between	  the	  two	  views.	  Since,	  as	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  do	  not	  take	  their	  accounts	  to	  apply	  to	  dispositional	  disagreements,	  this	  result	  will	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  two	  thinkers.	  
VII.	  Independence	  and	  the	  Dispositional	  Disagreement	  about	  Disagreement	  	   Independence	  is	  the	  explicit	  expression	  of	  an	  evidential	  disposition.	  It	  is	  also	  what	  grounds	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Steadfast	  and	  Conciliationism.	  Roughly,	  
Independence	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  disposition	  regarding	  what	  gets	  to	  count	  as	  evidence	  for	  or	  against	  peerhood.	  Steadfast	  theorists	  accept	  this	  disposition	  (and	  thus	  deny	  Independence)	  and	  Conciliationists	  reject	  it	  (by	  accepting	  Independence).	  This	  disposition	  claims:	  all	  disagreements	  (past	  and	  present)	  counts	  as	  evidence	  of	  
peer	  disparity	  between	  potential	  peers.26	  Independence	  claims	  that	  not	  all	  disagreements	  count	  as	  evidence	  of	  peer	  parity/disparity,	  but	  that	  only	  disagreements	  between	  peers	  independent	  of	  the	  disagreement	  presently	  under	  consideration	  are	  evidentially	  significant	  in	  this	  way.	  	   Thus,	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  about	  disagreement	  is	  itself	  a	  dispositional	  disagreement.	  This	  means	  that	  if	  the	  argument	  I	  will	  make	  in	  the	  next	  section	  is	  sound,	  neither	  Steadfast	  nor	  Conciliationism	  will	  apply	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  That	  current	  disagreements	  between	  potential	  peers	  are	  to	  be	  included	  as	  evidence	  in	  considerations	  of	  peer	  disagreement	  is,	  no	  doubt,	  what	  leads	  Kelly	  to	  characterize	  his	  view	  as	  the	  “Total	  Evidence	  View.”	  Conciliationism’s	  rejection	  of	  it	  is	  also	  why	  Christensen	  feels	  the	  need	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  his	  view	  “...is	  throwing	  away	  evidence.”	  (Christensen,	  2011)	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disagreement	  about	  disagreement.	  This	  is	  clearly	  a	  problem	  for	  these	  thinkers	  because	  they	  both	  consider	  the	  disagreement	  about	  disagreement	  to	  be	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  theories.27	  If	  the	  views	  are	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  this	  disagreement,	  then	  they	  will	  be	  theoretically	  incomplete	  by	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen’s	  own	  lights.	  While	  we	  might	  consider	  this	  conclusion	  quite	  limited,	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  there	  is	  problem	  for	  these	  views	  even	  if	  they	  concede	  that	  their	  accounts	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  disagreement	  about	  disagreement.	  
VIII.	  Resolving	  the	  “Spinelessness”	  Tension:	  Controversial	  Disagreements	  Are	  
Dispositional	  	   We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  appreciate	  how	  the	  distinction	  that	  I’ve	  been	  arguing	  for	  will	  resolve	  this	  tension,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  theoretically	  preferable	  to	  those	  on	  offer.	  But	  first,	  recall	  where	  we	  have	  come	  over	  the	  past	  couple	  section:	  1. Epistemically	  significant	  disagreements	  can	  be	  either	  calculative	  or	  dispositional	  2. Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  offer	  accounts	  committed	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  dispositional	  disagreements	  are	  not	  epistemically	  significant	  3. The	  disagreement	  between	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  about	  disagreement,	  which	  they	  both	  take	  to	  be	  epistemically	  significant,	  is	  itself	  a	  dispositional	  disagreement	  4. Thus,	  by	  their	  own	  lights,	  their	  accounts	  are	  incomplete	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  consider	  dispositional	  disagreements	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  (Kelly,	  2005;	  especially	  pages	  31-­‐33),	  and	  (Christensen,	  2011).	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Briefly,	  I’d	  like	  to	  consider	  the	  objection	  that	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  can	  simply	  bite	  the	  bullet	  on	  premise	  three,	  and	  concede	  that	  their	  accounts	  will	  fail	  to	  apply	  to	  their	  own	  disagreement	  while	  still	  maintaining	  that	  the	  accounts	  are	  theoretically	  complete.	  	   Perhaps	  it	  will	  be	  claimed	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  disagreement	  that	  I	  illustrate	  in	  this	  paper,	  disagreements	  between	  epistemic	  peers	  grounded	  in	  different	  evidential	  dispositions,	  really	  are	  possible,	  but	  that	  this	  is	  no	  problem	  for	  the	  targeted	  views	  since	  these	  cases	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  disagreement	  they	  aim	  to	  explain.	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  is	  itself	  a	  dispositional	  disagreement	  (and	  one	  to	  which	  they	  take	  their	  accounts	  to	  apply),	  but	  perhaps	  a	  way	  out	  for	  these	  philosophers	  is	  simply	  to	  give	  up	  the	  intuition	  that	  their	  accounts	  will	  apply	  to	  their	  own	  disagreement.	  Even	  if	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  admit	  that	  this	  instance	  of	  disagreement	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  analysis,	  however,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  vast	  revision	  of	  the	  disagreement	  literature.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  considering	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  “spinelessness”	  has	  been	  treated	  in	  the	  literature.	  	   As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  paper,	  “spinelessness”28	  is	  the	  inability	  to	  be	  epistemically	  confident	  in	  most	  (or	  perhaps	  any)	  of	  one’s	  views.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  various	  positions,	  including	  Conciliationism,	  lead	  to	  spinelessness.	  The	  idea	  is	  this:	  if	  you	  are	  supposed	  to	  give	  roughly	  equal	  weight	  to	  peers	  who	  disagree	  with	  you,	  then,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  many,	  many	  epistemic	  peers	  out	  there	  who	  actually	  disagree	  with	  you	  about	  positions	  you	  hold	  within	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Spinelessness	  is	  considered	  by	  (Elga,	  2007),	  (Kelly,	  2010),	  (Christensen,	  2007),	  and	  (Christensen,	  2011).	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wide	  range	  of	  topics,	  you	  will	  be	  rationally	  required	  to	  give	  up	  most	  of	  your	  beliefs.	  Recall	  Elga’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  worry:	  The	  equal	  weight	  view	  then	  requires	  you	  to	  weigh	  each	  stance	  equally,	  along	  with	  your	  own.	  But	  that	  requires	  you	  to	  think,	  of	  each	  stance,	  that	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  right.	  Typically,	  it	  will	  follow	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  the	  issue.	  Since	  it	  seems	  that	  you	  are	  in	  this	  circumstance	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  great	  many	  issues,	  the	  equal	  weight	  view	  requires	  you	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  all	  of	  these.	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  convictions	  on	  controversial	  political,	  philosophical,	  or	  scientific	  matters?	  The	  equal	  weight	  view	  seems	  to	  say:	  kiss	  them	  goodbye.	  (Elga,	  2007)29	  The	  salient	  feature	  of	  Elga’s	  comments	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  political,	  religious,	  scientific,	  and	  philosophical	  disagreements	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  within	  the	  range	  of	  accounts	  of	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement.30	  But	  surely	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Here’s	  Christensen	  defending	  conciliationism	  from	  a	  similar	  objection:	  “On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  areas	  of	  morality,	  religion,	  politics,	  and	  economics,	  and,	  unfortunately,	  philosophy	  which	  are	  rife	  with	  disagreement.	  Why	  is	  this?	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  disagreement	  flourishes	  when	  evidence	  is	  meager	  or	  poorly	  distributed,	  or	  when,	  due	  to	  our	  emotional	  or	  intellectual	  limitations,	  we	  are	  just	  not	  very	  good	  at	  reacting	  correctly	  to	  the	  evidence.	  In	  other	  words,	  disagreement	  flourishes	  when	  epistemic	  conditions	  are	  bad.	  To	  focus	  in	  on	  my	  own	  Field,	  I	  think	  that	  we	  all	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  epistemic	  conditions	  are	  not	  so	  great	  in	  philosophy.”	  (Christensen,	  2007c,	  28)	  Note	  that	  he	  does	  not	  use	  the	  objection	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  disown	  these	  sorts	  of	  cases,	  or	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  analysis,	  instead	  he	  opts	  to	  spin	  the	  incredibly	  revisionary	  implications	  of	  his	  view	  in	  a	  more	  favorable	  light.	  30	  There	  has	  been	  some	  concern,	  lately,	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  views	  may	  be	  more	  limited	  than	  it	  was	  previously	  believed	  (see	  especially	  (Christensen,	  2009;	  especially	  section	  5.3)).	  I	  take	  it	  to	  be	  a	  strength	  of	  my	  position	  that	  it	  would	  make	  it	  clearer	  how	  views	  of	  disagreement,	  though	  they	  don’t	  currently,	  could	  plausibly	  extent	  to	  such	  cases.	  If	  dispositional	  disagreements	  are	  as	  pervasive	  as	  I	  take	  them	  to	  be,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  as	  easily	  recognized	  as	  I	  have	  suggested,	  then	  spelling	  out	  the	  epistemic	  significance	  of	  disagreement	  in	  everyday	  life	  will	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  figuring	  out	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  fallibility	  with	  regards	  to	  our	  evidential	  dispositions	  requires	  belief	  revision.	  This	  will,	  presumably,	  be	  much	  more	  plausible	  a	  task	  than	  assessing	  the	  epistemic	  credentials	  of	  the	  numerous	  individuals	  with	  whom	  we	  disagree	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  (something	  that	  has	  led	  to	  skepticism	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  views	  like	  Steadfast	  and	  Conciliationism).	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disagreements	  (and,	  plausible,	  most	  or	  all	  of	  them)	  will	  be	  dispositional	  disagreements.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  probably	  disagreements	  in	  religion	  will	  involve	  differences	  of	  evidential	  dispositions	  (e.g.	  you	  treat	  Scripture	  as	  authoritative	  and	  infallible	  evidence	  and	  I	  don’t).	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  political	  and	  philosophical	  disagreements.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  is	  very	  implausible	  that	  all	  such	  disagreements	  are	  the	  results	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  calculative	  error	  that	  Steadfast	  and	  Conciliationism	  take	  to	  be	  primary	  in	  discussions	  of	  disagreement.	  But	  if	  these	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  within	  the	  range	  of	  epistemically	  interesting	  disagreement,	  we	  have	  to	  admit	  that	  these	  theories,	  in	  their	  present	  form,	  are	  incomplete.	  	   Recall	  the	  tension	  introduced	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper.	  It	  was	  between	  the	  following	  propositions:	  (1)	  The	  proper	  response	  to	  the	  cases	  on	  offer	  is	  to	  dramatically	  reduce	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  original	  proposition	  (2)	  Most	  of	  my	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs	  are	  ones	  with	  which	  many	  evidence-­‐sharing	  peers	  disagree	  (3)	  It	  would	  be	  irrational	  to	  go	  “spineless”	  with	  regard	  to	  these	  beliefs	  Given	  the	  independent	  motivation	  for	  my	  distinction,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  resolve	  this	  tension	  is	  in	  the	  following	  way.	  First,	  (1)	  is	  true	  because	  the	  cases	  on	  offer	  are	  examples	  of	  “calculative	  disagreement,”	  and	  dramatically	  reducing	  one’s	  confidence	  might	  just	  be	  the	  appropriate	  epistemic	  response	  to	  such	  cases	  (though	  this	  is	  what	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen	  dispute).	  Secondly,	  (2)	  is	  true,	  but	  the	  cases	  that	  would	  make	  “spinelessness”	  a	  real	  threat	  are	  actually	  cases	  of	  dispositional	  disagreement,	  and	  such	  cases	  will	  need	  to	  be	  treated	  very	  differently	  than	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calculative	  cases.	  This	  seems	  plausible	  enough	  (even	  if	  we	  don’t	  yet	  know	  what	  the	  appropriate	  response	  to	  such	  disagreements	  would	  actually	  look	  like).	  And	  finally,	  (3)	  is	  true	  because,	  given	  our	  distinction	  and	  the	  assumption	  that	  calculative	  and	  dispositional	  disagreement	  will	  rationally	  require	  different	  epistemic	  responses,	  “spinelessness”	  no	  longer	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  majority	  of	  our	  most	  confidently	  held	  beliefs.	  The	  tension	  is	  thus	  resolved.	  	   Further,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  resolution	  is	  theoretically	  preferable	  to	  any	  currently	  on	  offer.	  Elga’s	  suggestion	  that	  epistemic	  peerhood	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing	  agents	  is	  extremely	  rare	  seems	  primarily	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  an	  attempt	  to	  allow	  his	  theory	  to	  avoid	  the	  objection	  of	  “spinelessness.”	  If	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  take	  such	  an	  extreme	  position	  (and,	  given	  my	  distinction,	  we	  don’t),	  we	  should	  avoid	  it.	  Kelly,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would	  have	  to	  maintain	  that,	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  that	  would	  threaten	  “spinelessness,”	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  evidence	  actually	  supports	  maintaining	  confidence	  in	  one’s	  original	  belief.	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  this	  is	  true.	  Further,	  given	  my	  distinction,	  Kelly	  will	  have	  to	  argue	  how	  the	  “total	  evidence”	  can	  support	  one	  or	  another	  conclusion	  in	  disagreements	  between	  evidence-­‐sharing,	  epistemic	  peers	  with	  different	  evidential	  dispositions.	  Is	  there	  an	  objectively	  most-­‐rational	  way	  for	  those	  peers	  to	  construe	  the	  data	  (this	  seems	  improbable	  as	  it	  would	  seemingly	  amount	  to	  insisting	  that	  peerhood	  requires	  identity	  in	  evidential	  dispositions	  -­‐-­‐	  something	  I’ve	  argued	  against),	  or	  should	  we	  restrict	  cases	  of	  epistemically	  significant	  disagreement	  to	  cases	  where	  this	  is	  the	  case	  (again,	  this	  seems	  unmotivated).	  So,	  while	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  the	  distinction	  I’m	  drawing	  is	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strictly	  incompatible	  with	  either	  conciliationism	  or	  steadfastianism,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  my	  analysis	  has	  shown	  these	  theories	  to	  be	  incomplete	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	  
IX.	  Conclusion	  	   We	  may	  conclude	  from	  my	  analysis,	  then,	  that	  the	  discussion	  between	  
Steadfast	  and	  Conciliatory	  theories	  of	  disagreement,	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  accounts	  of	  Kelly	  and	  Christensen,	  are	  theoretically	  incomplete,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  many	  of	  the	  views	  arrayed	  along	  the	  “spectrum”	  between	  them	  share.	  It	  has	  been	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  recommend	  that	  epistemologists	  start	  recognizing	  the	  difference	  between	  dispositional	  and	  calculative	  disagreements,	  and	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  rationally	  responses	  required	  by	  each	  differ.	  Significantly,	  the	  distinction	  that	  I	  purpose	  here	  suggests	  a	  way	  in	  which	  disagreement	  itself	  can	  provide	  (properly	  third-­‐personal)	  considerations	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  figure	  into	  one’s	  deliberation.	  That	  is	  to	  say:	  dispositional	  disagreements,	  though	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  suggested	  how,	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  epistemically	  interesting	  qua	  disagreement,	  and	  they	  may	  show	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  distinctive,	  more	  social	  way	  in	  which	  we	  are	  required	  to	  deliberate.	  Perhaps	  this,	  then,	  is	  way	  of	  codifying	  my	  central	  concern	  in	  this	  paper:	  the	  worry	  of	  spinelessness	  (characterized	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  be	  defused	  at	  all	  costs)	  has	  obscured	  two	  major	  issues	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  disagreement:	  1)	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  shallow	  and	  deep	  disagreements	  fundamentally	  differ,	  and	  2)	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  may	  be	  required	  to	  figure	  the	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  of	  disagreement	  into	  each.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  perhaps	  another,	  more	  nuanced	  spinelessness	  worry	  looms	  just	  over	  the	  horizon.	  At	  this	  point	  we	  have	  not	  ruled	  it	  out.	  Taking	  seriously	  the	  distinction	  I’ve	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purposed	  in	  this	  paper	  may	  show	  us	  new	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  are	  required	  to	  recognize	  our	  epistemic	  fallibility	  (and	  new	  forms	  of	  epistemic	  fallibility	  at	  that).	  While	  such	  “spinelessness”	  worries	  will	  not,	  no	  doubt,	  be	  the	  crude	  and	  implausible	  sort	  that	  arose	  based	  on	  our	  equivocal	  treatment	  of	  calculative	  and	  dispositional	  disagreements,	  they	  may	  very	  well	  illuminate	  new	  and	  interesting	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  depend	  on	  the	  epistemic	  faculties	  of	  others	  to	  rationally	  keep	  ourselves	  in	  check.	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